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More than twenty years after the establishment of Critical Race Theory
(CRT) as a self-consciously defined intellectual movement, defining oneself
as a Critical Race Theorist can still engender the question: critical what
what? When asked, the inquiry is not just about the appellation, though
this is certainly part of what engenders the question. The query is about
the whatness (or, less charitably, the "there, there") of CRT as well. What
is the genesis of CRT? What are the core ideas? What are its goals and
aspirations? What intellectual work does the theory perform outside of
legal discourse? What are the limitations of the theory? What is its future
trajectory? This Afterword employs Kimberld Crenshaw's lead article,
and the essay responses to it, to engage the foregoing questions.
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More than twenty years after the establishment of Critical Race Theory
(CRT) as a self-consciously defined intellectual movement, defining
oneself as a Critical Race Theorist can still engender the question: critical
what what? When asked, the inquiry is not just about the appellation,
though this is certainly part of what engenders the question. Indeed, when
my colleagues and I proposed the establishment of a Critical Race Studies
specialization at UCLA School of Law more than a decade ago, the only
push back we got was over the name. Why Critical Race Studies? Why
not Civil Rights? Race and the Law? Anti-Discrimination Studies?
Ultimately, we succeeded in persuading our faculty that it made sense for
us to trade on and signal a connection to an intellectual movement of
which several of us considered ourselves a part.' But the episode
suggested that there was something in and about the name. By any other
name, 2 our faculty meeting on the matter would have been considerably
shorter. To borrow from George Lipsitz's contribution to this
Commentary collection, our engagement with our colleagues about this
particular institutional naming was a moment of "organizational learning."3
This should not lead one to conclude that the "Critical what what?"
question is only about the name. The query is about the whatness (or, less
charitably, the "there there") of CRT as well. What is the genesis of CRT?
What are the core ideas? What are its goals and aspirations? What
intellectual work does the theory perform outside of legal discourse? What
are the limitations of the theory? What is its future trajectory? This
Afterword employs Professor Kimberld Crenshaw's lead article, and the
responses to it, to take up the foregoing questions. As will become clear,
my engagement, which includes a number of "internal" critiques of CRT,
is decidedly incomplete and should be read more as a gesture towards
answering each of the questions than as a definitive response to them.
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For comments on or conversations about the ideas
expressed in this essay, I thank Paul Butler, Sumi Cho, Laura Gomez, Mitu Gulati, Cheryl Harris, Jerry
Kang, Rachel Moran, Daria Roithmayr, Frank Valdes, and Leti Volpp. Alicia Verani and Jonathan
Feingold provided invaluable research assistance. I thank the Connecticut Law Review editors for
soliciting this Afterword and for editorial suggestions.
'See Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215 (2002).
2 Cf.WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
George Lipsitz, "Constituted by a Series of Contestations ": Critical Race Theory as a Social
Movement, 43 CoNN. L. REv. 1459 (2011).
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II. CRITICAL RACE BEGINNINGS:
WHOSE GENESIS STORY IS IT, ANYWAY?
According to Crenshaw, a productive way to think about the
genesis of CRT is "frame misalignment." More particularly, Crenshaw
argues that:
One might say that what nourished CRT and facilitated
its growth from a collection of institutional and discursive
interventions into a sustained intellectual project was a
certain dialectical misalignment. Within the context of
particular institutional and discursive struggles over the scope
of race and racism in the 1980s, significant divergences
between allies concerning their descriptive, normative, and
political accounts of racial power began to crystallize. This
misalignment became evident in a series of encounters-
institutional and political-that brought into play a set of
"misunderstandings" between a range of individual actors
4
and groups.
One of these groups consisted of progressive white legal academics who
were part of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. Crenshaw's
argument, though not articulated precisely in this way, is that CLS created
a condition of possibility for CRT not only in the sense of rehearsing a set
of themes about the indeterminacy of law and about its productive capacity
(think Foucault)' to constitute social arrangements, social hierarchies, and
social interests but also in the sense of failing to seriously engage the role
of race as a phenomenon, not a epiphenomenon, in this process. When
Crenshaw speaks of "misalignment" with respect to CLS, it is this
"failing"-the extent to which race was peripheral to the movement-that
she has in mind. To put the point as Crenshaw does elsewhere, "our
dissatisfaction with CLS stemmed from its failure to come to terms with
the particularity of race, and with the specifically racial character of 'social
interests' in the racialized state."6 This, among other misalignments with
CLS, was generative of CRT.
David Trubek's contribution to this volume most directly engages
Crenshaw's intellectual genesis story. One might read his piece as a
competing "origin story" about the institutional, intellectual, and political
Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2011) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Twenty Years].
sI share Bob Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick's reading of Foucault. See Ben GOLDER & PETER
FIZPATRICK, FOUCAULT'S LAW (2009) (contesting the idea that "[i]n Foucault's modernity, law has
been overtaken by the more insinuative and productive powers of discipline or bio-power").
'Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
at xiii, xxvi (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS].
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factors that contributed to the formation of CRT. As David Engel explains,
the articulation and re-articulation of origin stories are "many things at
once: an act of insight, a reinterpretation of the past, [and] a reaffirmation
of core values and beliefs."7 In this respect, origin stories shape not only
our sense of the past; they shape how we experience the present and
imagine the future. Given this constitutive dimension to origin stories,
8Trubek's focus on Crenshaw's account is all the more important.
According to Trubek, Crenshaw's description of the origins of CRT "is
more of a foundational myth than a complete account of CLS's attitudes
towards race or its views about the sources of illegitimate hierarchy in
America." 9 Trubek concedes that "the leadership of CLS was largely
white and male; the movement was formed in the 1970s before women and
minority scholars entered legal academia in significant numbers."10 But
things changed:
[O]nce women and minority scholars did get jobs in law
schools, CLS tried to reach out to both groups.... Maybe
there were one or two who explicitly criticized the CRT
position as overstating the importance of race. But I know of
no CLS text that raised the "essentialism"' or "racialism"
critiques Crenshaw mentions."
In some ways, my characterization of Trubek's intervention as a
"competing origin story" understates the register in which he articulates his
claim. His thesis is not that Crenshaw overstates the misalignment thesis.
Trubek certainly could make this argument, particularly because in an
earlier account, in which Crenshaw and her co-authors raise similar
concerns about CLS, they specifically employ the term "aligned" to
characterize at least one side of the CLS/CRT relationship. 2 Moreover,
7 Engel was more specifically referring to "origin myths." David Engel, Origin Myths:
Narratives ofAuthority, Resistance, Disability and Law, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 785, 792 (1993).8 For other accounts of the genesis of CRT, see Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race
Coalitions: Key Movements that Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1377, passim (2000);
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future of Directions of Critical Race Theory and
Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 329 (2006) [hereinafter Mutua, Rise, Development and
Future].
9 David M. Trubek, Foundational Events, Foundational Myths and the Creation of Critical Race
Theory, or How To Get Along with a Little Help from Your Friends, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1503, 1509-10
(2011).
'
0 Id. at 1510.
11Id
12 See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 6, at xxvi-xxvii ("As a political
and intellectual matter, the upshot of this (CRT's) engagement with CLS can best be characterized as
'coalition.' We see CLS and CRT as aligned-in radical left opposition to mainstream legal
discourse."). This is not to say that the misalignment thesis is absent from this earlier articulation. On
the contrary, in several places Crenshaw, et al. describe what they perceive to be the normative and
theoretical tensions between CRT and CLS. My point is simply that it would not be unreasonable to
read the earlier account as suggesting that CRT's frame alignment and misalignment with CLS were
equally formative of CRT.
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Crenshaw's article in this volume is clear that CRT was both "attracted to
and repelled by" CLS.13  Finally, Gary Peller, "in contrast [to Crenshaw]
... partially focus[es] on what was aligned and in common between the
dominant CLS project and CRT at its inception, and the particular
theoretical direction that Crenshaw and others in CRT have since taken."l4
All of this suggests that there is a debate to be had about whether and to
what extent the genesis of CRT is a function of CRT/CLS alignment or
misalignment. Trubek's characterization of Crenshaw's claim as "a
foundational myth" is not a serious engagement of this issue.
So, how does Trubek support his argument? In part, his claim is based
on the fact that he is familiar with, and Crenshaw cites to, "no CLS text
that raised the 'essentialism' or 'racialism' critiques that Crenshaw"
attributes to CLS. 5 Fair enough. But there are a number of additional
questions one might still need to ask. One is: Would we expect all of the
contestations about CLS and race to appear in print? Another: How much
of an engagement with race does one see in CLS prior to the moment in
which CRT is explicitly organized as such? Of course, some CLSers, like
Alan Freeman, were seriously engaging matters related to race and the
law. But how many others and in what proportion? Moreover, to the
extent that CLSers were taking up race in their work, to what extent was
that engagement constitutive of the "imperial scholar" phenomenon
Richard Delgado describes? 7 I do not mean for these questions to be
rhetorical. My point is that Trubek might need to answer them before
characterizing Crenshaw's account as a foundational myth.'8
Furthermore, Trubek might also need to contend with the literature
produced by scholars of color specifically critiquing CLS for its
conceptualization of race and rights. In addition to Crenshaw,' 9 Pat
Williams,2 0 Harlon Dalton,2 1 Richard Delgado,22 Anthony Cook,23 and
1 Crenshaw, Twenty Years, supra note 4, at 1287.
14 Gary Peller, History, Identity, and Alienation, 43 CoNN. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (2011).
1s Trubek, supra note 9, at 1510.
16 See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053-54 (1978) (discussing the
social implications and context behind civil rights legislation).
17 See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 561 (1984) (discussing the extent to which white scholars writing about race
typically cited to themselves producing a endless and racially exclusive loop).
'8 Nor do I mean to put CLS scholars in some kind of "catch 22"-it's a problem if they don't
engage race (they are vulgar anti-essentialist) and it's a problem if they do (they are imperial scholars).
I simply mean to mark the fact that Trubek plays the empirical card against Crenshaw because she fails
to identify CLS articles that reflect the racialism and essentialist critique of CRT but he makes no effort
to empirically ground the counter-narrative he offers.
19 Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
20 Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV 401, 403--04 (1987).
21 Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435,440-41 (1987).
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Mari Matsuda,24 among others, are on record expressing a deep
dissatisfaction with CLS's alienation/indeterminacy/legitimation claims
about race and rights. These texts are out there, and they are relevant to
the question of whether Crenshaw's account of CLS's role in the formation
of CRT is a myth. While this body of work does not provide direct
evidence of the CLS critique of CRT as racialist or essentialist, it is direct
evidence of CRT scholarship advancing a racial critique of CLS. Trubek's
effort to broaden how we think about the genesis of CRT would have
benefitted from an engagement with this scholarship.
Trubek might very well still conclude, even after an engagement with
the CRT scholarship critiquing CLS, that Crenshaw's account remains a
myth. This would not necessarily be a function of what Russell Robinson
refers to as "perceptual segregation," 25 but could rather derive from
Trubek's sense of his own role, and the role of Wisconsin Law School, in
the formation of CRT. According to Trubek, Crenshaw insufficiently or
too narrowly describes these contributions. I have no basis upon which to
weigh in on this particular point; I was not present during any of these
foundational moments. My hope is that, going forward, CRT and CLS
scholars who experienced this history will engage Trubek's response to
Crenshaw's account. Is Trubek's counter-narrative corrective? Is it
hyperbole? Is it a foundational myth? These questions deserve to be
interrogated, not because doing so will lead to a definitive resolution but
precisely because narratives about CLS's role in the formation of CRT are,
like all genesis narratives, likely to be contested.
Another essay in this volume that bears on the genesis of CRT, and
about which I will say much less, is Tukufu Zuberi's Critical Race Theory
of Society. Zuberi's contribution argues that "[t]he antecedent ideas for
Critical Race Theory existed in the social sciences long before the
intellectual movement in law." 26 This, of course, begs the question of why
one does not see CRT as an organized intellectual movement in the social
sciences, a question that Crenshaw directly engages. Articulated another
way, that CRT has disciplinary precursors does not answer the question of
why those precursors did not become disciplinary-defining in the sense of
22 Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987).
23 Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985, 1005-12 (1990).
24 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HAy.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324-26 (1987).
25 Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (2008) (discussing the
extent to which race mediates our perception of events).
26 Tukufi Zuberi, Critical Race Theory ofSociety, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1573, 1578 (2011).
CRITICAL WHAT WHAT? I15992011]
producing in, say, sociology, what CRT produced in law.
This is not to say that social scientists have not critically engaged race.
Of course they have. Indeed, Zuberi's contribution is a mini-intellectual
history of sorts in which he identifies a number of scholars who, without
articulating it as such, took the critical race turn in their work. As he puts
it, "[t]he social sciences have always had their critical theorists of race."27
Zuberi's articulation of this intellectual backdrop, as well as its
relationship to intellectual contestations within the academy, including
controversies about ethnic studies, is helpful to understanding the genesis
of CRT in at least two respects. First, and as Crenshaw notes, the
establishment of ethnic studies was the institutionalized product of a set of
specific ideological contestations about the role of knowledge production
and education in the pursuit of racial justice. In this respect, one might
think of CRT as both an extension of this history and a replication of it in
legal education.28 Second, the first-generation Critical Race Theorists were
familiar with the ideas reflected in the ethnic studies literature and had
helped to institutionalize the field. Thus, while these would-be Critical
Race Theorists were certainly not fully formed intellectuals either as law
students or as young faculty within their respective institutions, nor were
they empty intellectual vessels into which ideas about CLS could be
poured. Many had been shaped by some of the very texts Zuberi mentions:
Black Folk Here and There, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas,
Black Reconstruction, Black Skin White Masks-as well as many others,
including Ain't I a Woman, and All the Woman are White, All the Men are
Black: But Some of Us Are Brave. The most cursory examination of the
footnotes of early CRT scholarship bears this out.2 9
Yet this background context for CRT is insufficiently acknowledged,3 0
let alone meaningfully analyzed. 3 1 As best I can tell, there is no law
27 Id at 1579.
28 Crenshaw, Twenty Years, supra note 4 at 1301 (observing that "many of the critiques of racial
power that were amplified and integrated within CRT had been generated by leading race scholars for
nearly a century").
29 See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539 (citing bell hooks); Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (citing Patricia Hill Collins); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1701 (1993) (citing Du Bois); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra
note 24 (citing Angela Davis); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (citing Paula Giddings);
Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir Re-read: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon
Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2599 (1992) (citing Edward Said). Significantly, each of foregoing authors
engaged a broader range of the ethnic studies literature than this footnote suggests. And there are other
CRT scholars who have done so as well. This, then, is simply a very limited indication of the space
ethnic studies occupies within CRT.
30 To some extent this is simply a function of the historical insularity of law as a discipline.
31 But see Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, James Turner, Africana and the Development of Critical
Race Theory, in "FREE YOUR MIND": JAMES TURNER AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICANA STUDIES
(Scot Brown & Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw eds., forthcoming) (draft on file with author).
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review article on ethnic studies and CRT that is analogous to Richard
Delgado's Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, a
re-telling of the genesis of CRT that focuses on white leftist intellectuals.32
To be clear: I am not arguing that CRT scholars should downplay the role
of CLS in shaping the development of CRT. I, for one, have learned a
great deal from this literature. Nor is my point that Richard Delgado
should not have written about liberal McCarthyism; efforts to broaden the
framework through which we understand CRT are important. What I am
suggesting is that, against a background in which the intellectual agency
and capacity of Blacks and Latinos are always already in doubt, it is all the
more important to mark the ethnic studies intellectual antecedents to CRT.
Zuberi's contribution is helpful in this respect. His essay is a reminder that
"prior to the CRT Movement America experienced the African-American
Studies Movement in the 1960s and 1970s."" We ought to understand this
movement, along with the development in ethnic studies more generally, as
part of CRT's intellectual and institutional history.
III. CRITICAL RACE BOUNDARIES: NOT IN OUR NAME
Related to debates about the genesis of CRT are debates about the
whatness of CRT. How precisely do scholars define this intellectual
movement? What are the core ideas? Crenshaw does not, in her Article,
articulate a definition of CRT; she is clear that her contribution is not a
primer on the theory, presumably because she has expressed her views
about the boundaries of CRT elsewhere.34 According to Crenshaw, "what
is in play here is less of a definitive articulation of CRT and more of a
socio-cultural narrative of CRT."35 In the context of offering this narrative,
Crenshaw describes CRT as an intellectual and political dynamic that is
constantly being re-constituted. She writes:
CRT is not so much an intellectual unit filled with
stuff-theories, themes, practices and the like-but one that
32 Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L.
REv. 1505 (2009). Delgado does in this piece make clear that CRT built "on the American civil-rights
tradition, including the work of such figures as Martin Luther King, Jr., W.E.B. Du Bois, and Cdsar
Chdvez, as well as Continental and postcolonial writers." Id. at 1511; see also RICHARD DELGADO &
JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2001) (observing that Critical Race
Theory draws from "the American radical tradition exemplified by such figures as Sojourner Truth,
Frederick Douglas, W.E.B. Du Bois, C6sar Chivez, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Power and
Chicano Movements of the sixties and early seventies").
3 Zuberi, supra note 26, at 1585.
34 See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 6; Charles R. Lawrence, III
et al., Introduction to WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 1-15 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); see also Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in the Closing Door," 49 UCLA L. REv. 1343,
1343-72 (2002).
3 Crenshaw, Twenty Years, supra note 4, at 1260.
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is dynamically constituted by a series of contestations and
convergences pertaining to the ways that racial power is
understood and articulated in the post-civil rights era. In the
same way that Kendall Thomas reasoned that race was better
thought of as a verb rather than a noun, I want to suggest that
shifting the frame of CRT toward a dynamic rather than static
reference would be a productive means by which we can link
CRT's past to the contemporary moment.
In suggesting that we conceptualize CRT as a verb, Crenshaw is not urging
us to jettison efforts to think of CRT as a "unit filled with stuff-theories,
themes, practices and the like." She is urging that we do so recognizing
that CRT "is dynamically constituted." This is an important point. We
need more, not fewer, efforts to define the "dynamically constituted"
borders of CRT.16 Our failure to adequately build on earlier efforts has
been costly.37 For one thing, as Rachel Moran puts it, CRT is now a little
"unruly."" While this unruliness has the virtue of rendering CRT both
inclusive and capacious, it carries with it some costs. Ideas that ought to
be repugnant to CRT-sexism, xenophobic nationalism, homophobia-
sometimes openly travel under its name. Concerned about a version of
this problem, Sumi Cho expresses "the need for caution and accountability
in what'we are putting out under the critical race rubric." 40 In addition to
the problem of accountability, there is a pragmatic reason for worrying
about the boundaries of CRT: a theory without clear boundaries is hard to
mobilize and describe as a theory.
But sometimes the very existence of boundaries, or the perception of
how and where they are drawn, can splinter progressive formations. Some
accounts of the breakdown of the CRT Workshop-that it was
insufficiently attentive to LGBT rights and the racial experiences of people
of color who are not African American-reflect this organizational
splintering. The issue came up at the very first CRT workshop I attended
36 There are now several CRT readers. In addition to texts already cited in this essay, see
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed.
2000); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1998); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds.,
2002). For CRT casebooks, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS
(Dorothy A. Brown ed., 2003); and RACE & RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA (Juan Perea et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). Each of these texts owes a debt to Derrick Bell's Race,
Racism and American Law.
37 I do not mean to suggest that there have been no recent efforts in this respect. See, e.g., Darren
Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187 (2004); Mutua, Rise,
Development and Future, supra note 8.
38 Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature ofDiscrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365,2375 (2003).
3 Although I will not here point to specific examples, a careful reader can identify "CRT"
scholarship that instantiates the ideas.
40 Sumi K. Cho, Multiplicities and Intersectionalities: Exploring LatCrit Diversities: Essential
politics, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 433, 434 (1997).
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in Washington, D.C., and some LatCrit scholars link these concerns about
boundaries to genesis narratives about LatCrit Theory-namely, that the
theory was in part a reaction to the perceived black-centered and
heterosexist-oriented nature of CRT.4 1 These are serious charges to which
first-generation Critical Race Theorists should respond.42
LatCrit theorists, for their part, need to more directly engage the
theoretical and organizational relationship between LatCrit Theory and
CRT. This, too, raises important questions about boundaries. I am not
suggesting that there has been no engagement on this topic. Frank Valdes,
for example, has taken up this issue in a series of LatCrit forewords and
afterwords.4 3 Indeed, as will become clear, some of the questions I raise
41 See Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, An Assessment ofLatCrit Theory Ten Years After, 83 IND.
L.J. 1151, 1187-88 (2008) ("In particular, the Black exceptionalist strand of CRT can wield a powerful
exclusionism toward other outsider groups. Two anecdotes illustrate what we characterize as a form of
identity assassination-that is, the discounting/erasure of the relevance of the group to which one
belongs or identifies with-as a form of boundary policing. The first example comes from a 1994 CRT
Workshop at the University of Miami Law School. A gay Asian and a gay Latino had included some
readings critical of the ways the U.S. race discourse privileged, presumed, and centered Black
heterosexual masculinity. During the portion of the workshop devoted to these readings, an African
American male raised a strong normative objection (to paraphrase): 'Critical Race Theory is about
RACE, not sexuality.' . . . . Seeking to avoid these types of identity assassinations, the initial LatCrit
conferences in part represented a reaction to the small invitation-only CRT workshops of the early-to-
mid-1990s and were explicitly intended to be inclusive, open, and committed to community building."
(citations omitted)); Elvia R. Arriola, Forward, Symposium on Diference, Solidarity and Law: Building
Latinalo Communites Through LatCrit, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) ("In fact, 'who are
we?' served as the question for plenary discussion on the first day of LatCrit II. As others and I
learned, a late night gathering of professors in Puerto Rico shared stories of feelings of hurt, confusion
and abandonment felt at CRT gatherings-gatherings that made no room for the experience and
insights of Latinas/os in the law. By the evening's end a venting of feelings had inspired a conference,
and a vow among the organizers to assure that the panels and audience that would become LatCrit
would be relentlessly characterized in substance and identity as inclusive and diverse."); Pedro A.
Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 387, 397-98 (2002) ("After all, LatCrit was born, in part, out of a sense of
exclusion(s) from the Critical Race Theory Workshop (the annual meeting of RaceCrits), which was at
the time dominated by African-American scholars. Additionally, the development of the Black/White
Binary Paradigm of race critique by LatCrit scholars was met with substantial discomfort, and even
some outright hostility, among our African-American fellow travelers. Nevertheless, because of
LatCrit's aggressive and often sensitive search for intersectionalities, and after strong debate, we have
largely managed to reach common ground that allows us to rotate centers to focus on particular groups,
without marginalizing other fellow outsiders." (citations omitted)); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White
Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1213, 1215 (1997) (stating that his article "illustrates the kind of contribution to critical theory that the
emergent Latino Critical Race Studies (LatCrit) movement may make. This movement is a continuing
scholarly effort, undertaking by Latino/a scholars and other sympathetic scholars, to examine critically
existing structures of racial thought and to identify how these structures perpetuate the subordinated
position of Latino/a in particular. LatCrit studies are, then, an extension and development of critical
race theory (and critical theory generally) that focus on the previously neglected areas of Latino/a
identity and history and the role of racism as it affects Latinos/as.").
42 I am not suggesting that such a response would definitively resolve the issue. My point is
rather that open and transparent engagement of the issue is in order.
4 See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Foreword Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider
Jurisprudence and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); Francisco Valdes,
Afterword: Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential
Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999).
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below re-articulate queries Valdes has posed but that remain largely
unanswered." Does the annual LatCrit Conference render CRT
conferences unnecessary? What work, if any, do LatCrit Conferences
perform that CRT conferences cannot reproduce? How do people who are
both LatCrit scholars and CRT scholars demarcate the boundaries of these
intellectual identities? Is it analogous to being a feminist and critical race
theorist? Or a feminist and a queer theorist? From a LatCrit perspective,
is there something inherent in CRT that prevents the theory from taking up
the issues LatCrit scholars continue to argue were (are) absent from CRT?
And what's in the name? Crenshaw describes how the term "Critical
Race Theory" came into being this way:
Turning this question over, I began to scribble down
words associated with our objectives, identities, and
perspectives, drawing arrows and boxes around them to
capture various aspects of who "we" were and what we were
doing. The list included: progressive/critical, CLS, race, civil
rights, racism, law, jurisprudence, theory, doctrine, and so on.
Mixing them up and throwing them together in various
combinations, one proposed combination came together in a
way that seemed to capture the possibility we were aiming to
create. Sometime toward the end of the interminable winter
of 1989, we settled on what seemed to be the most telling
marker for this peculiar subject. We would signify the
specific political and intellectual location of the project
through "critical," the substantive focus through "race," and
the desire to develop a coherent account of race and law
through the term "theory."a'
What mix of ideas went into the appellation LatCrit Theory? What are the
implications of naming an identity in that movement? Should African
Americans write under the rubric of BlackCrit theory? Is asking this
question tantamount to asking whether law schools should have white law
students' associations? Is the perception-still-that CRT is de facto
BlackCrit theory? Was CRT hostile to the experiences of non-black
"Here are some of the questions Valdes has raised:
Is Critical Race Theory a project of or for Latinas/os qua Latinas/os . .. should it
be, can it be? For Latinalo legal scholars, several key underlying questions
immediately arise. Does the Black/White paradigm somehow define or delimit
Critical Race Theory in a conclusive or definitive manner? Conversely, do or can
critical race discourses and venues place Latinas/os at the center, at least for some
significant portion of the time? Is critical "race" theory concerned with "ethnicity"?
Should it be? Is, can, or should Critical Race Theory be a viable and inviting project
to those with a Latina/o subject position?
Franciso Valdes, Foreword: Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in
Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. I (1996).
43 Crenshaw, First Decade, supra note 34, at 1360-61.
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people of Color? How have Richard Delgado, Gerald Torres, Mari
Matsuda, and Neil Gotanda (and other people of color who are not African
American) responded to this claim? Did they feel excluded from or
marginalized in CRT? Did they feel silenced or disciplined by the
movement?
What role, if any, does safe space play in LatCrit organizing? Has
LatCrit avoided some of the hard "critical" boundary questions by
functioning as a "safe space" for everyone? Some of the fights within CRT
explicitly centered on whether adopting a set of specific themes or
normative commitments would be consistent with the notion of "safe
space. Are similar fights occurring within LatCrit? Is LatCrit an effort
to un-do the perceived boundaries of CRT? Is it an effort to re-do those
boundaries? If so, along what lines?
I raise the foregoing questions about LatCrit, and about CRT in the
earlier paragraph, because each resides at the interstices of Crenshaw's
conceptualization of CRT as both a "verb" and a "unit filled with stuff-
theories, themes, practices and the like." I raise these questions because
they invite us to specifically discuss the boundaries of CRT-descriptively
and normatively.
Yet, one might still worry about Critical Race Theorists doing so. As a
counter-hegemonic project, the notion of Critical Race Theorists drawing
boundaries is troublesome; boundary work is unavoidably fraught with the
4 As Crenshaw explains:
The safe-space interests and the intellectual coherence objectives were
occasionally pitted against one another. For example, some disagreement developed
in the second workshop over the question of the relationship between resisting
racism and resisting patriarchy and homophobia. Some of us felt that patriarchy and
homophobia were intertwined in racial power and thus were inseparable from the
scope of CRT. Others felt that racial subordination was distinct and should be
theorized as such. Some participants framed the issue as a conflict over whether
CRT would have a theoretical "line" or whether as a safe space, it was a big tent
open to all comers. Yet others pointed out that, in some respects, the debate was
really about competing visions over what was necessary to make CRT a safe space.
If CRT resisted acknowledging and theorizing the intersection of racism with
patriarchy and heterosexism, could it really be considered a safe space for all
members of this diverse group of men and women of varying sexual identities?
One also could recalibrate other debates that were pitched as tension between the
call for safe space and the call for substantive content as, in fact, a tension between
competing conceptions of substantive content. For example, the organizational goal
of "safe space" served as the provisional justification for the initial inclusion of
people of color only. One might frame the issue as safe space values having
trumped substantive content: Identity, rather than substantive criteria, won out as a
defining factor in determining participation in the workshop. However, this, too,
could be framed as competing substantive perspectives. Was CRT a product of
people of color, or was CRT a product of any scholar engaged in a critical reflection
of race? Because I subscribe to the latter proposition, I regard the traditional
exclusion of whites from our workshops as an unfortunate development. But, of
course, opinions on this and similar issues vary considerably among original and
subsequent workshop participants.
Id at 1362-63.
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politics of inclusion and exclusion, as the preceding discussion attests. On
the other hand, the absence of boundaries can be fraught as well.47 The
question of whether to draw lines, then, cannot be resolved a priori or in
the abstract. Nor should our engagement of this issue reflect the formalism
that all boundary work is fungible, whether it takes the form of CRT
scholars deciding which ideas and normative commitments to include in
the theory or the form of American legal institutions deciding which
people to include in the nation. The tensions that boundary work
inevitably produces should not be an argument against boundary work per
se. Charles Lawrence puts this point well:
In hard times, I think it more important than ever to define
clearly who we are and what we stand for. I am not for
talking about the silly debate over whether certain individuals
have been, or should be, barred from attending Critical Race
Workshops... . But . .. we must be clear about what we
stand for.48
In arguing that Critical Race Theorists should more clearly define the
normative and theoretical parameters of CRT, I am not proposing a once-
and-for-all formulation of the theory. As Athena Mutua explains, "CRT is
a work in progress."49 At the same time, in any given moment, there
should be a set of (even provisional) ideas and frames that are available for
mobilization and that are themselves re-constituted in the process.
George Lipsitz's contribution is instructive on this point. In the
context of conceptualizing CRT as a social movement, Lipsitz describes a
dynamic relationship among political ideas, political actors, and political
movements that is helpful to approaching how we might think about the
"whatness" of CRT. According to Lipsitz:
The boycotters in Montgomery did not start out
demanding an end to segregation on the buses. They
protested the arrest and humiliating treatment accorded Rosa
Parks for refusing to give up her seat to a white passenger
and move to the back of the bus. Initially, they sought only a
more humane form of segregation. When the city resisted
their demands, however, making it clear that no concessions
would be forthcoming, discussions at mass meetings made
the Black population of Montgomery more aware of its
4 Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the Wake of
Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513 (2011) (discussing the problem of boundary-less market
states).
4s Charles R. Lawrence, III, Foreword: Who Are We? Why Are We Here? Doing Critical Race
Theory in Hard Times, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra
note 36, at xvii-xviii.
49 Mutua, Rise, Development and Future, supra note 8, at 331.
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linked fate and more enthusiastic about the prospect for
broader changes. The lunch counter sit-ins by students began
with the modest goal of seeking the right to eat a hamburger
next to a white person. But the disciplined collective action
required to mount and sustain struggle in the face of vigilante
violence, arrests, and incarceration led to the organization of
SNCC and the recognition by Ella Baker and others that the
struggle had become concerned with something "bigger than
a hamburger."50
I am confident that we can do the same within CRT-that is,
"organizationally learn" as we develop and deploy the ideas and frames we
think should travel under our name. Indeed, we have already evidenced
the ability to do so. CRT grew out of a series of organizationally learned
lessons, what Paulo Freire would call moments of "[r]eflection and
action" '-about ethnic studies, about safe spaces, about traditional civil
rights, about CLS, about colorblindness, about retrenchment politics, and
about the institutional cultures of law schools. These organizationally
learned moments have helped to constitute the theory. Because CRT can
neither speak for itself nor do its own work, CRT scholars should continue
to frame CRT in terms of both the work the theory is performing and the
work CRT might still need to do. Doing so is consistent with Crenshaw's
call to conceptualize CRT as a verb. Being specific about what CRT does
and aspires to do is especially critical because, as Sumi Cho and Frank
Valdes's essay empirically demonstrates, post-racialism is quickly
emerging as the rhetorical replacement for colorblindness. 2 Against this
backdrop, it is all the more important that we heed Charles Lawrence's
imperative that "[w]e ... know who is us.""
The question, then, becomes: What are (or should be) some of CRT's
core ideas? One might start by saying that CRT rejects the standard racial
progress narrative that characterizes mainstream civil rights discourse-
namely, that the history of race relations in the United States is a history of
linear uplift and improvement. Of course, America's racial landscape has
improved over time, and CRT scholars should be ready to point this out.
The problem with the racial progress narrative, however, is that it elides
what I would call the "reform/retrenchment dialectic" that has constituted
America's legal and political history.54  Consider the following three
examples: (1) the end of legalized slavery and the promulgation of the
so Lipsitz, supra note 3, at 1464-65.
51 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 75 (1982).
52 See Valdes & Cho, supra note 47.
5 Lawrence, Foreword, supra note 48, at xviii.
54 Crenshaw engages a variation of the problem in Race, Reform and Retrenchment, supra note
19. Her project in that piece is to "challenge[] both the New Left and the New Right critiques of the
civil rights discourse."
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Reconstruction Amendments (the reform) inaugurated legalized Jim Crow
and the promulgation of Black Codes (the retrenchment); (2) Brown v.
Board of Education's dismantling of separate but equal in the context of
K-12 education (the reform) was followed by Brown II's weak "with all
deliberate speed" mandate (the retrenchment); (3) Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s vision of racial cooperation and responsibility, which helped to secure
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the reform), was re-deployed
to produce a political and legal discourse that severely restricts racial
remediation efforts: colorblindness (the retrenchment). A linear narrative
about American racial progress obscures this reform/retrenchment
dynamic.
Nor do racial progress narratives make clear that the episodes we
celebrate today as significant moments of racial reform (e.g., Brown ) were
moments of national crisis, moments that contested what Lani Guinier has
called the "tyranny of the majority," 5 counter-majoritarian moments,
moments preceded by mass political mobilization. Far from reflecting
national harmony in which the country as a whole agreed that racial change
was in order, racial reform typically has occurred when the equality
interest of people of color converges with the interest of powerful elites;
and "even when the interest convergence results in an effective racial
remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the point that policy makers fear
that the remedial policy is threatening"56 to the dominant social order.
This, of course, is Derrick Bell's theory of interest convergence, which he
offers as an explanation for the reform/retrenchment dynamic I have
described. The broader point is that one of CRT's key claims is that racial
reform and racial retrenchment are defining aspects of American law and
politics.
In addition to rejecting the civil rights linear racial progress narrative,
CRT repudiates the view that status quo arrangements are the natural result
of individual agency and merit. We all inherit advantages and
disadvantages, including the historically accumulated social effects of race.
This racial accumulation-which is economic (shaping both our income
and wealth),57 cultural (shaping the social capital upon which we can
draw),'8 and ideological (shaping our perceived racial worth)-structure
our life chances. CRT exposes these inter-generational transfers of racial
compensation. Building up over time to create racial shelters (hidden and
protected racial privileges) and racial taxes (hidden and unprotected racial
5 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).56 DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69 (2004).
5 See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1997).
" Cf PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL
CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, AND HOMo-ACADEMICUS (1962).
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costs), 9 racial compensation profoundly shapes and helps to support the
contemporary economies of racial hierarchy.o CRT intervenes to correct
this market failure and the unjust racial allocations it produces.
One way the theory does so is by challenging two dominant principles
upon which American anti-discrimination law and politics rest-to wit,
that colorblindness necessarily produces race neutrality and that color
consciousness necessarily produces racial preferences. By historically
contextualizing existing racial inequalities, CRT is able both to contest
the [colorblindness/race-neutrality]/[color-conscious/racial preferences]
alignments and to reverse them. The theory effectuates this reversal by
demonstrating how colorblindness can produce racial preferences and how
color consciousness can neutralize and disrupt embedded racial
advantages.
CRT also weighs-in directly on the very idea of race, rejecting the
conception of race as a biological fixed social category and arguing instead
that race is socially constructed. Part of this effort includes describing race
as a performative identity, one whose meanings shift not only from social
context to social context but from social interaction to social interaction.
Under this view of race, people actively work their identities to shape how
others experience them.62 And even when a person does not intend to
manage her identity in this way, the racial meanings others ascribe to her
(Is she racially assimilationist? Is she racially counter-cultural?) will turn
at least in part on her performative identity. Imagine, for example, two
black women-one of whom has dreaded hair; the other's hair is relaxed.
Neither intends to employ her hair to make a racial statement about herself.
Notwithstanding the absence of that intent, both will be racially interpreted
(and even interpellated, to draw from Althusser)63 based at least in part on
5 Cf JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1999).
6 One might also think about this in terms of what I would call the "racial deficits" and "racial
surpluses" we inherit.
61 See generally Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L.
REv. 1139 (2008).
6'2 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000);
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 701 (2001); see
also Mario L. Barnes & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, By Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded As"
Black and Why Title VII Should Apply Even IfLakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1283;
Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther
King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (2008); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y
Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994). Scholars outside of the field of CRT have also drawn on this insight. See,
e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
63 According to Althusser: "There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind
them) the hail rings out: 'Hey you there!' One individual (nine time out often it is the right one) turns
around, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i.e., recognizing that 'it really is he' who is
meant by the hailing. But in reality things happened without succession. The existence of ideology
and the hailing or interpellation of individual as subject are one and thus the same thing." LOUis
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their hair. As between the two women, people are more likely to "read"
the woman with dreads as racially counter-cultural. 4 This is because, as
Paulette Caldwell, 65 Angela Onwuachi-Willig,66 and Margaret Montoya 6 7
have explained, hair is racially constitutive. Self-presentation or
performance more generally is as well. This performative understanding
of race suggests that people are not born raced, to re-articulate a point
Simone de Beauvoir makes about sex; they become raced, in part through a
series of cognizable acts.68  These acts-which we rehearse, renew, and
revise-become consolidated over time, constituting the very thing (race)
we imagine to be ontologically prior.
CRT rejects the view that race precedes law, ideology, and social
relations. Instead, Critical Race Theorists conceptualize race as a product
of law, ideology, and social relations. According to CRT, the law does not
simply reflect ideas about race. The law constructs race: Law has
historically employed race as a basis for group differentiation, entrenching
the idea that there are "in fact" different races; law has helped to determine
the racial categories (e.g., Black, White, Yellow) into which institutions
and individuals place people; law sets forth criteria or rules (e.g.,
phenotype and ancestry) by which we map people into those racial
categories; law has assigned social meaning to the categories (e.g., Whites
are superior; Blacks are inferiors; Japanese Americans are disloyal); law
has employed those meanings to structure hierarchical arrangements (e.g.,
legalized slavery for inferior people (Blacks) and legalized internment for
people who are disloyal (people of Japanese descent)); and those legal
arrangements, in turn, have functioned to confirm the social meanings that
law helped to create (e.g., the people who are enslaved must be inferior;
that is why they are enslaved; the PCeople who are interned must be
disloyal; that is why they are interned). 0
CRT has also focused more specifically on how the law constructs
ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 174-75 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).
6 See generally Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 62 (discussing these
dynamics).
65 See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
66 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under
Title VII, 98 GEO. L. REV. 1079 (2010).
67 Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas, supra note 62, at 185.
68 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 12-13 (Constance Borde & Sheila Malovany-
Chevalier trans., Knopf 2009) (1949).
69 Cf Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 523 (1988) ("[T]he body becomes its gender through a series of
acts which are renewed, revised and consolidated through time."). But see BRUCE WILSHIRE, ROLE
PLAYING AND IDENTITY: THE LIMITS OF THEATRE AS METAPHOR (1982) (arguing that gender is not a
performance)
70 Devon W. Carbado, What Exactly Is Discrimination on the Basis ofRace? (draft on file with
author).
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whiteness, thus, for example, Cheryl Harris's arguments about "whiteness
as property"7' and Ian Haney L6pez's white-by-law analysis of the
naturalization cases.72 These efforts are part of a broader body of work
demonstrating that, historically, whiteness has functioned as a normative
baseline. We are all defined with whiteness in mind. We are the same
as, or different from, whites. Think, for example, about some of our
contemporary debates about racial equality. Essentially, two competing
paths exist to pursue racial equality in the United States: demonstrate either
that people of color are the same as, or different from, whites. To draw
from an observation that Catherine Mackinnon makes about sex: "The
main theme in the fugue is 'we're the same, we're the same, we're the
same.' The counterpoint theme . . . is 'but we're different, but we're
different, but we're different. "'74 Both of these conceptions of equality
implicitly have whiteness as their reference. Under the sameness
framework, people of color are measured in terms of their correspondence
to whiteness; under the difference framework, we are assessed according to
our non-correspondence.
This sameness/difference dynamic helps to explain how race figures in
equal protection analysis. Critical Race Theorists have long criticized
what Jerry Kang and I call the race per se approach to equal protection-
the presumption that any use of race is constitutionally suspect.7 As a
result of this presumption, the government needs to articulate a compelling
justification for incorporating race into its decision-making. To put the
point more doctrinally, race-based governmental decision-making must
survive strict scrutiny. The baseline effects of whiteness, and the
n See Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 29, at 1713 (describing "whiteness" as a
"valuable asset" that whites seek to protect).
72 IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006).
7 See, e.g., CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). Feminists have made similar points about gender. See
Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting it and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 48 (1988) ("The
norms and the dynamics of the natural world-the way its biological, evolutionary, and even chemical
and physical properties are explained-embody unstated male reference points."); see also Janet E.
Ainsworth, In a Diferent Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103
YALE L.J. 259, 316-17 (1993) (noting that "the law's incorporation of a male normative standard may
be invisible but it is not inconsequential"). One can, of course, advance similar claims about
heterosexuality. See Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76
(2000).
74 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 34
(1987); see also Carbado, Straight, supra note 73 (drawing on Mackinnon's sameness/difference
analysis).
7 Here, too, I am merely re-articulating a point Mackinnon makes about sex. See Carbado,
Straight, supra note 73.
76 Devon W. Carbado & Jerry Kang, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny (draft on file with author).
n See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Race-based classifications must
also be narrowly tailored, which, roughly, means that even when the government has a compelling
reason for incorporating race into its decision-making, the means by which it does so should be
carefully thought out and narrowly circumscribed.
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sameness/difference dynamic it produces, provides a partial explanation
for why this is so. Because we are all (supposed to be) the same as
whites-because race is ostensibly nothing but skin color 7 -judges should
"strictly scrutinize" instances in which the government treats us differently
by relying on race." At the same time, because we (people of color) are
said to have different racial experiences than whites and this difference is
perceived to facilitate the "robust exchange of ideas," the government may,
at least in the context of higher education, invoke diversity to justify
relying on race.so
At the front end of equal protection analysis, then, the notion is that
people of color are formally the same as whites (taking race into account
treats them differently and thus should be strictly scrutinized);8' at the back
end of the analysis, the racial experiences of people of color are perceived
to be substantively different (thus, the government can employ diversity as
a compelling justification for affirmative action). Under the strained logic
of this sameness/difference approach, people of color are the same as, but
have different racial experiences than, whites. One way to make sense of
this would be to say that equal protection doctrine reflects a strong
imperative that people of color should be the same as whites; but,
understanding that they are not, the doctrine reflects a weak and
instrumental tolerance of their difference.
Neil Gotanda has engaged this problem of sameness and difference by
critiquing what he refers to as the Supreme Court's formal approach to
equal protection.82  Under this approach, evidence of formal sameness in
treatment precludes the finding of discrimination. Other CRT scholars,
such as Charles Lawrence, have linked this problem of racial formalism to
intent-centered models of discrimination, models that require evidence of
78 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). According to the Court:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to
the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of
their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces
the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.
We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.
Id at 647-48.
' Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
so Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
" Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder our Constitution there can be no
such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race . . . . In the eyes of government, we are just one race
here. It is American."); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d
949, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Adarand for the same proposition); Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs,
Orange Cnty., Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Bd.
of Educ. of Akron City Sch. Dist., 937 F.Supp. 700, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (same); U.S. v. Adair, 913
F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (same); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 1993 WL 761489, *27
(S.D. Ohio, 1993) ("[W]e are all members of one and only one race, the human race.").
82 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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discriminatory intent to sustain an anti-discrimination cause of action.8 3
Still other CRT scholars, such as Darren Hutchinson, have demonstrated
how the Supreme Court's commitment to treating people formally the
same "has effectively inverted the concepts of privilege and subordination;
it treats advantaged classes as if they were vulnerable and in need of
heightened judicial protection, and it views socially disadvantaged classes
as privileged and unworthy of judicial solicitude." 84 Each of these efforts
is part of a broader CRT project to articulate racism as a structural
phenomenon, rather than as a problem that derives from the failure on the
part of individuals and institutions to treat people formally the same.
Informing CRT's structural account of racism is the notion that racism
is endemic in society. It is, to put it the way Daria Roithmayr might,
"locked-in."85 This locked-in feature of racism is linked to our very system
of democracy. Which is to say, historically, racism has been constitutive
of, rather than oppositional to, American democracy. This does not mean
that racism is an expression of American democracy. That would be
putting the point too strongly. It is more accurate to say that racism was
built into the constitutional architecture of American democracy. As
Rachel Moran and I explain elsewhere, "[t]he drafters of the Constitution
took a sober second look at the rhetoric of radical egalitarianism in the
Declaration of Independence, and they blinked. The adoption of the
Constitution in 1787 and its ratification one year later depended on a
compromise, one that integrated slavery into the very fabric of American
democracy." 86 The lingering effects of this foundational moment-or the
ongoing relationship between racial inequality and American democracy-
is precisely what Gunnar Myrdal referred to as an "American dilemma." 8 7
In describing racism as an endemic social force, CRT scholars argue
that it interacts with other social forces, such as patriarchy,
homophobia,8 9 and classism.90 The theory is thus committed to what
8 Charles R. Lawrence, HI, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
84 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 615 [hereinafter
Hutchinson, Unexplainable].
85 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination,
86 VA. L. REv. 727 (2000).
86 DEVON W. CARBADO & RACHEL F. MORAN, Introduction to RACE LAW STORIES 8 (Rachel F.
Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
$GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944).
88 See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 582 (1990).
89 See generally Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561 (1997); Russell K. Robinson, Racing the
Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2009).
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Crenshaw has called "intersectionality"-and, more specifically, to an
intersectional engagement of structural hierarchies. 91 This engagement
endeavors not only to "look to the bottom," to borrow from Mari
Matsuda;92 it also seeks to "look to the top."9 3 In other words, the theory
seeks to make clear that there is a "top" and a "bottom" to discrimination94
and that, historically, racism has been bi-directional: It gives to whites
(e.g., citizenship) what it takes away from or denies to people of color.
Framing discrimination in this way helps to reveal an uncomfortable truth
about race and power: The disempowerment of people of color is achieved
through the empowerment-material or psychological-of whites. There
is no disadvantage without a corresponding advantage, no marginalized
group without the powerfully elite, no subordinate identity without a
dominant counterpart. As Guy-Uriel Charles argues, "[1]ooking at the
gaping racial disparities [in America] on most socio-economic indicators,
there are clearly two classes of citizens: Whites and coloreds."96 Racism
has historically drawn this line, effectuating and maintaining a relational
difference that is based on power. CRT attempts to describe the role law
plays in enabling this racial arrangement.
Critical Race Theorists pursue this project across racial groups, 97 and
in the context of doing so try to avoid what Angela Harris might refer to as
the pitfalls of essentialism." While some would say CRT scholars are
90 See generally Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunities, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2009).
91 See generally Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 29.
92 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 24.
9 See generally Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283 (2002).
94 See id
9 Of course, whiteness is not a monolithic identity category. Class, sexual orientation, among
other aspects of person, shape how whites experience their whiteness. Understood in this way, whites
have differential access to the privileges of whiteness. See id. at 1297; see also Camille Gear Rich,
Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010). At the same time, whites across differences can
nevertheless trade on whiteness, if only psychologically. Du Bois's notion of the wages of whiteness
speaks precisely to this idea. Du Bois argued that "the white group of laborers, while they receive a
low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage." W.E.B. Du Bols,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK
FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 700
(1965). Du Bois's point was that, notwithstanding the material deprivations that working class whites
historically have experienced, they were able to draw on the psychological wages of whiteness, which
they treated as a material resource against the background of presumptions of black inferiority. See
DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991).
9 Guy-Uriel Charles, Towards a New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 353
(2007).9 See, e.g., ROBERT CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE
(1999); Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model
Minority Meets Suzie Wong, I J. GENDER RACE & JUSTICE 177 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. I (1995).
9 On the problem of essentialism in feminist legal theory, see generally Harris, Race and
Essentialism, supra note 88.
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anti-essentialist, it would be more accurate to say that we aspire to be anti-
essentialist. The distinction is important. Because to invoke any social
category is already to essentialize, the question is not whether we engage
in essentialism but rather the normative work we deploy that essentialism
to perform.
Part of that work entails highlighting the discursive frames legal and
political actors have employed to disadvantage people of color. These
frames include, but are not limited to: "colorblindness," 99 "illegal alien," 00
"terrorist,"'0 ' "reverse discrimination,"'0 2 "foreigner,"' 03  merit," "the
border,"'o "citizenship,"l 06 "the war on drugs," 0 7 and "the war on
terror."',0 8  Even our most celebrated constitutional frameworks, such as
"equal protection"'09 and "due process,"" 0 can function as repositories of
racial power. CRT reflects "a desire not merely to understand . . . [these
and other] vexed bond[s] between law and racial power but to change ...
[them].""' The theory is both pragmatic and idealistic. It grapples with
the immediacies of now without losing sight of the transformative
possibilities of tomorrow.112
9 See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 82.
l00 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in US. Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009) (discussing racialization of illegal aliens).
101 Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
102 Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential
Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARv.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1994); see also Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 123 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fil105/
crenshaw.pdf.
113 Keith Aoki, "Foreign-Ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War H1
Propaganda, and Bfiercated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1996); Robert S. Chang,
Dreaming in Black and White: Racial-Sexual Policing in the Birth of a Nation, the Cheat, and Who
Killed Vincent Chin?, 5 ASIAN L.J. 41 (1998).
'" See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113 (2003); Harris & Narayan, supra note 102.
1os See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic
Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters:
Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indaiference of the
Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525; George A. Martinez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm
Shift? 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 517.
10 See HIROSHI MOTUMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the
Prism ofAlienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285 (2002); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
107 See PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOp THEORY OF JUSTICE 43-36 (2009); Paul
Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873 (1999).
los See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes
ofPassion, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1259 (2004).
109 See Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1753 (2001).
n1o See Jane Rutherford, The Myth ofDue Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
.' See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 6, at xiii.
112 See WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 34, at 3 (describing CRT as "both pragmatic and
utopian").
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Clearly, the foregoing ideas do not fully capture CRT. Nor is my
summary articulation of them a particularly good window on the
transformative work CRT can perform. Luke Harris's and Gary Peller's
contributions to this Commentary volume are helpful in this respect.
Harris's response employs narrative to challenge race neutral articulations
of merit; Peller's response illustrates the importance of the claim that race
is a social construction. I discuss each in turn.
Harris's contribution provides a narrative backdrop to a series of
arguments he has advanced challenging both merit and race-neutrality,
particularly as scholars, policy makers, and judges have deployed them in
the affirmative action context." 3 Part of his effort has been to demonstrate
why a racial preference understanding of affirmative action is flawed. His
narrative provides an answer.
Yale Law School was an unlikely destination for Luke Harris. "A
myriad of factors paved the way," including "the hard work of a loving
great Aunt . . ,the constructive interventions of a devoted and positive
mentor outside of my school," affirmative action admissions, and a sense
of self that the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements helped to create.
According to Harris, his own life's story made it difficult for him to
consider himself "special" or "exceptional" vis-A-vis black students who
did not make it to that particular ivory tower. There were too many people
like him for whom Camden-"one of the poorest urban communities in the
United States"-would be their life and death. Harris was at Yale not
because he was the "best black" and the people he left behind were "the
worst," but because of the set of contingencies and convergences that had
little to do with Harris's own "merit."
The narrative Harris articulates about Yale Law School reveals the
ease with which Yale institutionalized the affirmative-action-as-preference
frame. Virtually absent from the debate about black student admissions at
Yale was "an institutional/structured analysis . . . of racialized
hierarchy."ll 4 The absence of that analysis meant that the different racial
and social paths students traveled to enter Yale's admissions pool, and the
extent to which Yale's admissions criteria embedded race-at the very
least in the sense of producing racially disparate admissions outcomes-
mattered far less significantly than the applicants' "numbers," that is, their
GPAs and standardized test scores. In Yale's admissions process, GPA
and LSAT scores functioned as race neutral proxies for merit.
More fundamentally, the students' different educational and life
113 See, e.g., Harris & Narayan, supra note 102, at 3 (arguing that because "Blacks are viewed
as ... [the] principal beneficiaries" of affirmative action policies, "the confusions and misconceptions,
as well as the hand-wringing and soul-searching that looms over affirmative action, are most forcefully
articulated with regards to race-based policies that pertain to African Americans").
" Luke Harris, Beyond the Best Black: The Making of a Critical Race Theorist at Yale Law
School, 43 CoNN. L. REv. 1379, 1397 (2011).
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trajectories-some marked by race and/or class privilege; others marked
by race and/or class disadvantage-did not force Yale to reconsider the
baseline assumption that Harris argues under-wrote Yale's admissions
regime-that students were competing on a level and race-neutral playing
field. To the extent that the admissions baseline is determined to be
racially neutral, it becomes easy to view affirmative action as the moment
in which race enters an otherwise colorblind admissions process.
Cheryl Harris and I have advanced a version of this argument,
invoking what we call "the baseline assumption":
Under one view, the baseline is formally and
substantively equal and candidate X, who is black, and
candidate Y, who is white, are similarly situated with respect
to their opportunity to gain admissions. Affirmative action
disrupts this baseline equality by tilting the process in favor
of Candidate X over Candidate Y. Under another view, the
baseline is unequal and affirmative action is necessary to
counteract the structured impediments to Candidate X. Here,
formally taking race into account helps to offset the current
admissions practices that are stacked in ways that prefer
whites and disadvantage blacks."'
In developing this argument, we built on Harris's prior work with Uma
Narayan, specifically, their "anti-preference" framework for
conceptualizing affirmative action.' That framework remains under-
utilized in CRT. In fact, many CRT scholars characterize affirmative
action as preference; they simply argue that it is a preference for which
there are compelling justifications. Harris's essay demonstrates why that
framing is wrong. By incorporating his narrative into his anti-preference
framework, Harris reveals how both "merit" and "racial neutrality" can
mask the racial privilege and disadvantage they produce.
While Peller's response is not explicitly structured around the notion
of race as a social construction, his argument demonstrates the importance
of the idea. For the most part, when scholars invoke the claim that race is a
social construction, they develop it to challenge biological conceptions of
race. Peller's intervention is a productive reminder that race is constructed
ideologically as well.
Consider this point with respect to what Peller calls "integrationism."
Integrationism constructs racial consciousness "to be the central evil of
racism,"'17 and colorblindness to be a necessary predicate for antiracism.
"s Carbado & Harris, supra note 61, at 1200.
"6 Harris & Narayan, supra note 102, at 26 n.101 ("[T]he terminology of 'preference' that
dominates the discourse on affirmative action impedes critical reflection.").
" Peller, supra note 14, at 1483.
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Under integrationism, colorblindness and race neutrality are one and the
same thing."'8 Peller's argument identifies at least six ideas about race that
(a particular brand of) integrationism ideologically produces:
* Race is irrelevant
* Discrimination derives from individual bias and
unequal treatment
* Equal treatment produces racial equality
* Racial equality mandates colorblindness
* Colorblindness is racially neutral
* Color consciousness produces racial preferences
Each of the preceding ideas shapes how we think about race as an identity
category, racism as a social practice, and racial remediation as an
intervention. This is the sense in which these processes ideologically
construct race. Peller's response highlights this role.
Peller's contribution also foregrounds another dimension of the social
construction of race thesis-the essence/existence debate about race. On
one side of the debate is the argument that, because there is no essence to
race, there is no racial existence. On this view, race simply isn't real.
Making race the subject of politics, or people the subject of race, reifies the
social category. Indeed, for some, embracing the idea that an identifiable
racial subject is a necessary predicate for politics is to enact a form of
racial subjugation. Crenshaw refers to arguments of the foregoing sort (of
which there are various articulations) as "vulgar anti-essentialism." On the
other side of the debate is the argument that the fact that race is socially
constructed (in the sense of having no essence) does not mean that race is
not real (in the sense of having no existence). For people on this side of
the argument, the failure to make race the subject of politics, and people
the subject of race, is to elide and entrench the non-essential/material ways
in which race operates. As Peller's essay demonstrates, the vulgar anti-
essentialism thesis cannot withstand scrutiny. According to Peller,
[T]he African American community exists as a group and can
be followed through time and space even if the group can
never be objectively and definitively defined; even if its
borders are continuously contested; even if its meaning is
multiple and indeterminate. It is true that the group's
existence is partly constituted by performances, in which the
group is produced by being articulated and rearticulated. It is
true that the group may be constituted very differently in the
118 See Carbado & Harris, supra note 61, at 1195-98.
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future, or maybe not "exist" in the future at all. But that
contingency does not make the group less real." 9
Peller's argument is not that we should ignore the problems of
essentialism. Nor is he unmindful of the ways in which our political and
legal interventions sometimes over-determine the content of our categories,
obscuring their contingency and false necessity. 120 His argument is simply
that we should not conflate the social construction of race claim (or the
absence of racial essence) with arguments about racial materiality (or the
absence of racial existence).
IV. CRITICAL RACE TRAVELLING
A useful starting point for thinking about the extent to which CRT has
travelled across disciplines is to invoke Edward Said's concept of
travelling theory. According to Said,
Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories
travel-from person to person, from situation to situation,
from one period to another. Cultural and intellectual life are
usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of
ideas, and whether it takes the form of acknowledged or
unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale
appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one
place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling
condition of intellectual activity. Having said that, however,
one should go on to specify the kinds of movement that are
possible, in order to ask whether by virtue of having moved
from one place and time to another an idea or a theory gains
or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical
period and national culture becomes altogether different for
another period or situation.121
In engaging this issue, Said was particularly worried about the extent to
which theories lose their originality and insurgency as they travel from one
domain to another. More than a decade later, Said revisited the topic, not
so much to repudiate his prior position but to more fully articulate another
possibility: that theories can become more insurrectionary and capacious as
they travel.122  In other words, rather than domesticating or enervating
" Peller, supra note 14, at 1501.
120 For a discussion of the concept of false necessity in legal theory, see generally ROBERTO M.
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL
DEMOCRACY (1987).
121 Edward W. Said, Traveling Theory, in THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRITIC 226 (1983).
122 Edward W. Said, Traveling Theory Reconsidered, in REFLECTIONS ON EXILE AND OTHER
ESSAYS 436-52 (Moustafa Bayoumi ed., 2000).
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theories, "movement" might radicalize and invigorate them.
A concrete way of pursuing some of the concerns Said raises is to
think about how Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream"
speech has discursively and normatively traveled. Many Americans are
familiar with one particular line: "I have a dream that my four little
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the
color of their skin but by the content of their character."l 2 3 This line has
travelled from animal rights organizing,124 to disability rights advocacy,125
to the gay rights movement,12 6 to neo-conservative politics,12 7  to
contestations about race outside of the United States. 28
In marking these various domains to which portions of King's speech
have travelled, I do not mean to be normative. I present them to raise a set
of questions about travelling theory. Are King's words being lost in
translation as they move across the foregoing civil rights contexts? Should
King be able to restrict the ways in which his ideas circulate? In thinking
about the applicability of King's ideas outside of the precise context in
which King articulated them, should we try to figure out what King
himself would have wanted? If King appeared before us today and said: "I
do not support the application of my 'I Have a Dream' speech to gay
rights," should that be authoritative of the relevance of his words to that
struggle? Is there some principle of "fair use," not in the strict intellectual
property sense but in a normative sense, that should govern how we think
about any of this? If so, what principles should guide our thinking?
Each of the preceding questions might be engaged with respect to how
CRT has travelled to other disciplines. How should we assess the work
CRT has performed across the disciplines? Should we adopt a kind-of
Critical Race originalism-that is, examine the burgeoning CRT literature
123 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963),
available at http://www.mlkonline.net/dream.htmI.
124 See, e.g., Lynn Hoover, I Have a Dream Speech, President's Message at First Annual
International Association of Animal Behavior Consultants Conference (June 3-5, 2005) (incorporating
Dr. King's message into an address regarding the treatment of animals with behavioral problems).
123 See, e.g., Interview by Disability News and Information Service with Shivani Gupta, et. al.
(Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.dnis.org/interview.php?issueid=12&volumeid=6&
interviewid=l 30 (showing the various hopes and impacts of international disability rights advocacy in
India).
1
2 6 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, I Have a Dream . . . of What, TEX. TRIANGLE, Sept. 4, 2003,
http://igfculturewatch.com/2003/09/04/i-have-a-dream-of-what/ (describing the impact of Dr. King's
speech on the gay community and the continued hesitance, even by Dr. King's children and
grandchildren, to accept gay marriage).
127 DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 163
(1996); Dinesh D' Souza, Improving Culture to End Racism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785, 788
n.10 (1996).
128 Selective Incorporation: The Dialectic of Free Trade and Protectionism in Brazil-US Race
Discourse presented at the conference, Race and Racisms in Two Americas: A Dialogue On Inequality
and Affirmative Action in the U.S and Brazil," at PUCI-Rio, Brazil (2007) [hereinafter Selective
Incorporation] (draft on file with author) (critiquing the ways in which American racial discourses are
being "selectively" incorporated into debates about race and affirmative action in Brazil).
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outside of law in light of what our CRT Foremothers and Forefathers might
have wanted-and might still want? When CRT travels to other
disciplines, should we be concerned about what it carries back? While
neither Gloria Ladson-Billings's nor Glenn Adams and Phia Salter's
contributions directly engage all of these questions, their essays provide an
opportunity to reflect on the interdisciplinary travels of CRT.
Ladson-Billings's response describes the development of CRT in the
field of education. It's a story in which Crenshaw's Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment article plays a pivotal role. As Ladson-Billings explains:
After reading that article we [Ladson-Billings and her co-
author William Tate] realized that the earlier [CRT] pieces
we had read . .. [also] took race as its central analytic tenet.
Much of our own graduate school training had taken a more
classical sociological tact on race where it was seen as a
"variable" with a "stable" meaning. The . . . works we were
starting to read from legal scholars suggested that actually the
inverse was operating, i.e., race (and racism) were being
made stable-a permanent feature of U.S. society. . .. Once
we realized that legal scholars had begun to think differently
about race and racism, we knew we had to spend more time
in the law library rather than our School of Education
Library. 129
In Ladson-Billings's account, part of what travelled from CRT to
Education were the ideas that race could, and should, function as the
analytical core of one's scholarly engagements; that race was a product of
racism, not a pre-existing identity to which racism subsequently attached;
and that education scholars and activists could enlist the general tenets of
CRT to stage theoretical, institutional, and policy interventions in the
context of education.
Ladson-Billings (and her co-author William Tate) would go on to write
a key article that helped to form CRT in Education-Toward a Critical
Race Theory in Education.13 0 More than fifteen years later, CRT is now a
vibrant part of the discipline, with LatCrit and Tribal Critical Theory spin-
offs. One does not get the sense from Ladson-Billings's account that
scholars of education are experiencing difficulty translating CRT into
educational theory and policy-making; CRT is now "naturally" a part of
the race and education literature. Indeed, Marvin Lynn and Adrienne
Dixson, both scholars of education, are in the process of putting together
129 Gloria Ladson-Billings, Race ... to the Top, Again: Comments on the Genealogy of Critical
Race Theory, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1439 (2011).
IN Gloria Ladson-Billings & William F. Tate, IV, Towards a Critical Race Theory in Education,
97 TEACHERS C. REC. 47 (1995).
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an anthology of CRT in education, or what they are tentatively calling
"The Handbook of Critical Race Theory and Education."
CRT's relationship to psychology is less intellectually congenial, at
least according to Glenn Adams and Phia Salter. They argue that "[a]
Critical Race Psychology is not yet born."13 ' Adams and Salter offer two
reasons why this is so, each of which, paradoxically, characterizes the
context from which CRT emerged in the legal academy: (1) psychology is
structured around a colorblind epistemology (this is true of law); and (2)
psychology conceptualizes discrimination in terms of individual actors,
rather than institutional structures (this is true of law). Their story,
interestingly, then, is about misalignment. But whereas the misalignment
between the colorblindness-centered and the individual actor-focus of law
and the newly emerging field of CRT spurred the growth of the movement
in legal academia, the very same misalignment in psychology has stunted
CRT's development in that discipline.
What is particularly provocative about Adams and Salter's
contribution is not their claim that it "would be premature or too generous
to identify psychological science as a site where CRT flourishes,"1 3 2 but
rather that part of the development of CRT includes an elision of the ways
in which the discipline of psychology is racialized. Their concern, in this
sense, is not just about whether CRT has travelled into psychology, but
also about how psychology is travelling into CRT. They argue that "[i]n
their understandable eagerness to appropriate empirical evidence that bears
on the legitimizing authority of psychological science, perspectives like
Critical Race Realism may turn a blind eye toward the racial positioning
inherent in scientific theory and method." 33 Adams and Salter are clear to
point out that they are not arguing that CRT scholars should abandon
psychology. Their point is that we should recognize that psychology can
function as a "'Trojan Horse' of racism." 3 4
I share their concern. Critical Race Scholars have not thought hard
enough about the costs and benefits of CRT's empirical turn to
psychology. The implicit bias studies are (psychologically?) seductive,
particularly because they provide a tool with which CRT scholars can
attempt to overcome two of the most difficult obstacles to race conscious
remediation: colorblindness and the intent standard. Implicit bias studies
see through colorblindness and beyond intentionality. 135 Adams and Salter
are not asking us to give up these epistemological advantages. But they are
1' Glenn Adams & Phia S. Salter, A Critical Race Psychology Is Not Yet Born, 43 CoNN. L. REV.
1355 (2011).
"' Id. at 1357.
" Id. at 1360.
14 Id at 1376.
1s See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and
the Law, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465 (2010).
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asking us to "be wary of the conceptual and ideological tools packed
inside" psychology.136 Boiled down, their admonition is that when CRT
scholars travel to psychology, we should be mindful of the ideas about race
and science we implicitly bring back. In this respect, their argument is not
the standard pushback against science from the left, which critiques
science as a legitimizing discourse that masks its own ideology.'3 Adams
and Salter's contribution stages a broader critique of the ways in which the
disciplinary and disciplining conventions of science embed problematic
ideas about race along three interrelated axes-discursively (shaping how
scientists talk about race), methodologically (shaping how they investigate
race), and organizationally (shaping how scientists demographically and
culturally constitute themselves as an intellectual community).
V. CRITICAL RACE FUTURES
I won't, in this part, articulate what Jerry Kang and Kristin Lane might
call a future history of CRT.'3 8 But I do want to think a little bit about our
Critical Race future, employing Tanya Hemindez's and Sumi Cho and
Frank Valdes's contributions to do so. What unites their responses is the
sense that CRT's future will include a more robust engagement with global
affairs. Hernindez's global turn is to "focus more deeply on comparative
law." 3 9 According to Hernindez, "[c]omparative law can make a useful
contribution in the effort to refocus the [U.S.] racial lens."l 40 Herndndez
seeks to do so by comparing Brazilian racial dynamics to the racial
dynamics in the United States.
A standard way to think about the Brazilian and the American racial
landscapes comparatively is to say that whereas America's racial culture is
"hard," Brazil's is "soft"; whereas Brazil is a domain of racial fluidity,
America is the land of racial rigidity; whereas racial rigidity is bad, racial
fluidity is good.14' Hemndez's comparative analysis disrupts these
associations. Her response demonstrates that, notwithstanding that Brazil
was not a dejure Jim Crow state in the way that America was, its problems
with racial inequality are no less severe. By every social index, Afro-
Brazilians, particularly Afro-Brazilian women, fare worse than other
Brazilians. In the context of advancing this empirical claim, Hernandez
136 Adams & Salter, supra note 121, at 1376-77.
137 See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. Louis L. REv. 1139, 1139-
50(2010).
138 See Kang & Lane, supra note 135.
139 Tanya Kateri Hemndez, The Value of Intersectional Comparative Analysis to the "Post-
Racial" Future of Critical Race Theory: A Brazil-US. Comparative Case Study, 43 CoNN. L. REV.
1407 (2011).
14 0 Id. at 1410.
141 Selective Incorporation, supra note 128 (contesting this hard/soft dichotomy and more
generally critiquing the reproduction of American colorblind logics in Brazilian racial discourses).
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also notes the contradiction between Brazil's collective sense of itself as a
"racial democracy" and the prevalence of some of the quintessential
markers of what David Theo Goldberg has called the "racial state"l 42
* Racial profiling and harassment by the police
* Racial disparities in prosecution and conviction
* Rampant employment discrimination
* Residential segregation
* Racial inequities in education and health care
* Stereotypes of Afro-Brazilians as lazy, dirty,
intellectually inferior, sexually promiscuous, and
criminally inclined
The existence of these social facts in Brazil highlights an important
similarity between Brazil's nation-building ideology (racial democracy)
and our own (colorblindness): they both obscure and facilitate the very
racial dynamics against which they are formally positioned.143
Sumi Cho and Frank Valdes's global turn seeks to encourage CRT
scholars to take up the global phenomenon of "market states"-states that
are created by the "free market" movement of capital transnationally.
According to Cho and Valdes, "[e]xperience suggests that the market-state
overtakes the nation-state both from within and without."'" To put the
point slightly differently, the nation state becomes ("mainly/merely?") the
mechanism through which market states are globally consolidated. This
process, I would add, is dialectical in the sense that unbounded market
states play a constitutive role vis-A-vis bounded nation states. Which is to
say, market states do not undo nation states; they re-do them. America's
participation in and facilitation of international economic and political
events helps to construct its national identity. As Ash Bdli and Aziz Rana
argue in another context, "American commitment to spatial
omnipresence-particularly through a continually growing network of
military outposts-has become central to national self-understanding and
to presumptions about its global purpose."' 45
Part of the intervention Cho and Valdes make is to demonstrate the
continuities between the role law plays domestically with respect to
142 DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE (2002).
14 Crenshaw's Global Affirmative Action Project (GAAP) has been interested in examining
precisely this relationship between national ideologies (e.g., French Civil Republicanism) and racial
inequality across a number of national contexts. For an indication of the scope of GAAP, see AFRICAN
AMERICAN POLICY FORUM, aapf.org (last visited May 30, 2011).
4 Valdes & Cho, supra note 47, at 1564.
145 Ash Blli & Aziz Rana, American Overreach: Strategic Interests and Millennial Ambitions in
the Middle East, 15 GEOPOLITICS 210, 213 (2010).
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questions of race, power, and privilege, and the role law plays
internationally. They argue that international law is structured around
three primary projects: (1) managing the former colonies so as to maintain
"neocolonial privilege"; (2) shaping the international scene ideologically,
in part by a formal commitment to human rights; and (3) structuring
international economic arrangements to reproduce "neocolonial
hierarchies."'4 From this, they maintain, "the origins of international
law-like the origins of law generally-are found in the more specific
need of the ruler to rule the ruled."1 47
And, indeed, one can describe American domestic law along the lines
of the three entailments Cho and Valdes set out, namely that, historically,
American law has (1) managed the nation state to maintain white privilege
or what Cheryl Harris calls whiteness as property 4 8 (this tracks Cho and
Valdes's point about "neocolonial privilege"); (2) shaped the domestic
scene ideologically, in part by articulating a formal commitment to
colorblindness (this tracks their argument about international law's formal
commitment to human rights); and (3) structured economic arrangements
to reproduce historical racial hierarchies (this tracks Cho and Valdes's
claim about the reproduction of "neocolonial hierarchies"). Understood in
this way, international law, like domestic law, constitutes the very
environments it purports merely to regulate.
Cho and Valdes conclude their article with a series a questions about
CRT and market states:
How will CRT get ahead of the curve regarding the
predicted, and perhaps impending, paradigm shift between
nation-state and market-state systems? How will CRT,
rooted in the (legal) academy of the United States, engage the
Global South to ensure that old and new sovereignties do not
converge to rearticulate and reinscribe across this Earth
"traditional" patterns of racial stratification? In this brackish
moment of traditional and prospective sovereignties, how
will CRT strive to rearticulate citizenship to ensure that this
legal concept does not once again revert to a facile tool of
white supremacy and anti-color xenophobia? And how will
CRT help translate democracy from its current, formalistic
practice within weakened nation-states that prop up unjust
neocolonial skews to a robust engine of social justice that
perhaps could lead to a truly "post"-colonial and functionally
post-racial society? How, in other words, should CRT
' Valdes & Cho, supra note 47, at 1568.
141 Id. at 1567.
14 See generally Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 29.
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endeavor to interconnect the legal, the socio-legal, and the
socio-economic in time of flux and paradox that nonetheless
converge again on racial erasure in favor of white-identified
capital and "traditional" biases that structurally and culturally
privilege whiteness and neocolonial elites in general?l4 9
These strike me as important questions for CRT scholars to engage as they
continue to think about the directions in which to take CRT's global turn.
VI. CRITICAL RACE CONCLUSIONS
Like her other work, Kimberl6 Crenshaw's article in this Commentary
volume will be generative. Indeed, this volume is already a window into
the kind of engagement we can expect. Rather than summarizing what I
have already said, and in the spirit of looking backwards to move forwards,
this conclusion identifies ten themes, issues, and problems CRT scholars
might need to take up to push the theory further along.
1. Marking Boundaries. I have already expressed my hope that part of
the future of CRT will include more efforts to define the core concepts
within the movement, without ever rendering CRT an intellectual
accomplishment, whose parameters are fully worked out. I worry that our
failure to do so will render the idea of CRT more important than the ideas
within CRT? In other words, I worry that CRT could become (is
becoming? has become?) a "name" that has no clearly identifiable
"thing.'
5 0
2. Assessment. How should we assess the work that CRT has
performed? The number of law review articles that reference the term?
Cases that cite to our work? Our numbers in the legal academy? The
reach of the literature outside of law? Our engagement with communities
outside of the academy? Who is our primary constituency? Should we
think of ourselves first and foremost as academics? In short, how do we
know whether we are measuring up-and with respect to what standard?
After twenty years, we have to begin asking ourselves-and answering-
these questions.
3. The Critique of the Black/White Paradigm. Notwithstanding the
currency of the term "the Black/White Paradigm," it remains decidedly
under-theorized in CRT."' My hope is that scholars will think harder
about what this term means and what work, if any, Critical Race Theorists
should mobilize the "Black/White Paradigm" rubric to perform. Currently,
the term stands in for too much (any discussion of black and white race
149 Valdes & Cho, supra note 47, at 1571-72.
Iso Cf BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) (referring to sexism as the "thing that
has no name").
11 This part draws heavily portions of Carbado, Race to the Bottom, supra note 93, at 1305-12.
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relationships seem to trigger the term--and too little (offering insufficient
guidance on what our multi-racial engagements should look like and
producing instead a proliferation of identity-specific theorizing). While I
am not against identity-specific theorizing per se, that intellectual activity
should not stand in for multi-racial analyses. Declaring, for example, an
"Asian American moment," as Bob Chang did almost two decades ago, a
move that crucially highlighted Asian American legal subjectivity, is not
the same thing as declaring a Multiracial Moment.152 The two are, of
course, related. The more we know about Asian Americans, the more
complete our racial picture of the American landscape. Chang's article
brought pieces of that landscape into sharper focus. Written in 1993,
Chang's intervention was an important early effort to further expose and
disrupt the racialization of Americans as both "perpetual foreigners" and
"model minorities." His work built on and helped to generate
organizational and theoretical efforts that challenged the duality of this
racial construction.
As Athena Mutua explains, "[b]y shifting the Critical Race Theory lens
to other racialized [i.e., non-Black] groups, . . . analyses [like Chang's]
brought in important discussions of both historical and contemporary . .
[significance]."'5 She would thus encourage more work of the sort that
Chang produced, as would I. But she would also encourage "shifting
bottoms," which she articulates "as a complement to the process of
'rotating centers."' 1 5 4 The basic idea here is that no one group should
permanently occupy the center of our anti-racist analysis. No one group
should stand in for "the bottom" or monopolize our racial imagination.
While this framework leaves some questions unanswered (by what criteria
do we shift or rotate the bottoms?), Mutua's argument moves us in the
right normative direction. Thus, I build on it below.
In addition to shifting bottoms or rotating centers, a Multiracial
Moment might require more "racially integrative" modes of analysis.
Here, the question would not be whether we have moved from discussing
Black/white relations to, for example, discussing Asian/white relations.
Rather, the question would be whether our racial analyses integrate the
experiences of multiple racial groups. Two examples of work in this
category are Laura G6mez's book, Manifest Destinies, and Bob Chang and
Neil Gotanda's article, The Race Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian
American Jurisprudence.'5 ' I discuss each project in turn.
152 Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1265 (1993).
153 Mutua, Rise, Development and Future, supra note 8, at 338.
15' Athena Mutua, Shifing Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit II and the
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1178, 1179 (1999).
15 LAURA E. G6MEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE
(2007); see also Robert S. Chang & Neil Gotanda, LatCrti A7 Symposium: Working and Living in the
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Nowhere in Manifest Destinies does Gomez employ the term the
Black/White paradigm. Yet, her work is one of the most sophisticated and
historically robust accounts of how people of Mexican descent became a
race, of the role law played in that process, and of the ways in which that
racialization interacted with, shaped, and was itself shaped by, the
racialization of other subordinate groups. Calls to get beyond the
Black/White paradigm often stand in for, but do not actually perform, this
kind of intellectual work. This is part of what troubles me about the
critiques of the Black/White paradigm.
Bob Chang's and Neil Gotanda's, The Race Question, similarly offers
a robust account of multiracialism. While, unlike G6mez, Chang and
Gotanda embrace the Black/White Binary terminology, The Race Question
is a careful argument about both the role racism plays in structuring
minority-minority interactions and the anti-racist potential of different
forms of multiracialism. Part of what is productive about their analysis is
their explicit claim that the problem-and potential-of racial binaries
transcends whether they are articulated in black and white terms. My hope
going forward is that LatCrit and CRT scholars will build on their work.
In addition to the limited way in which multi-racialism figures in the
Black/White Paradigm critique, there are other difficulties with the
standard arguments scholars rehearse against the Black/White Paradigm,
some of which I sketch out below."'
The Black End of the Binary. Scholars should not employ the
Black/White paradigm to suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that America has
grappled fully with the nature and extent of racism against Blacks. The
fact that Blacks may occupy a central racial space in the American social
and political imagination does not mean that the ways in which Black
people are imagined (a) comport with how Blacks see themselves or (b)
reflect their cumulative social experiences on the bottom.
Nor should arguments against the Black/White paradigm obscure the
costs associated with occupying one end-the negative and subordinating
end-of a polarity. Much of the critique of the Black/White paradigm
focuses on how the Black/White paradigm privileges the racial victim
status of African Americans. Little attention is paid to the ways in which
African Americans might be disadvantaged as a result of being included in
the paradigm. Consider, for example, that while Blackness can stand in for
general criminality (because of stereotypes about race and crime), welfare
abuse (because of the racial trope of the welfare queen), and the
Global Playground: Fronstage and Backstage: The Race Question in LatCrit Theory, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012
(2007).
156 One of the few critiques of the discourse on the Black/White paradigm is Janine Young Kim,
Are Asians Black?, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999). I do not agree with all of her claims, but the essay
constitutes a very thoughtful intervention. For another thoughtful critique, see Athena Mutua, Shyfling
Bottoms, supra note 154.
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unqualified affirmative action beneficiary (because of racial assumptions
about black intellectual deficit), the category cannot stand in for general
working class disadvantage, including joblessness (because of arguments
about black cultural pathology and work ethic), the difficulties of
motherhood (because of the perception of black women as bad mothers), or
the problems of mass incarceration (because of the perceived criminal
propensities of black men and women). These are just some of the costs
of occupying the subordinating end of a polarity.
Multiracialism and the Black/White Paradigm. The critique of the
Black/White paradigm should not essentialize or monolithically represent
Black/White understandings of American racial dynamics. There is not
one Black/White framing of American race relations, but several.
Critiques of the Black/White paradigm implicitly suggest that Black/White
framings of race advance a single thesis about American race relations that
is primarily or exclusively about White and Black Americans. But a
Black/White analysis of race can have a multiracial focus. One could, for
example, examine the ways in which all people of color, and not just
Blacks, have been racially subject to Black/White-structured legal and
political regimes. Three examples will suffice to make this point.
First, in People v. Hall,'57 the Supreme Court considered whether a
California law that prohibited Blacks, Mulattos, and Native Americans
from serving as witnesses in cases in which a White defendant was on trial
also prohibited people of Chinese descent from so serving. Hall was
charged with the murder of a Chinese woman. At trial, after hearing
testimony from three Chinese witnesses and one White witness, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty.'58  The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction. Reasoning, in effect, that Blackness is a racial metaphor, a
signifier for non-White identity, the Court held that the testimony of the
three Chinese witnesses was improperly admitted.15 9 Under the Court's
view, the Chinese witnesses were, for purposes of California law, Black.
Second, in Ozawa v. United States, 6 0 the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine whether Takao Ozawa was eligible for naturalization
under an immigration and naturalization statute that granted the right of
naturalization to "free white" people and persons of "African nativity" and
of "African descent.""'6 Invoking both his skin tone and his assimilated
lifestyle, Ozawa asserted that he was White. The Supreme Court rejected
his claim. Ostensibly applying a scientific test, the Court argued that
"4 Cal. 399 (1854).
s See id. at 399.
s See id at 403-04.
'6 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
16' Act of July 14, 1879, ch. 255, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 (1942) (superceded by 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1943)).
It was not until 1952 that the Black/White ban for naturalization was disrupted. See Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952, ch. 2, § 311, 66 Stat. 239 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (2001)).
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people of Japanese descent are "clearly of a race which is not Caucasian
.... A large number of the federal and state courts have so decided ....
These decisions are sustained by numerous scientific authorities . . . .
Here again, the experiences of a non-Black/non-White group are being
shaped by a law that is articulated in Black/White racial terms. Because
Ozawa was neither Black nor White, he lacked the racial standing to
naturalize.
A final example of this phenomenon is Gong Lum v. Rice.163 Gong
Lum challenged the separate but equal regime in Mississippi when his
daughter, Martha Lum, was denied the right to attend an all-White high
school. His argument was that because Martha was not "colored ... mixed
blood, but .. . is pure Chinese,"'6 the state of Mississippi could not legally
prevent her from attending the all-White high school in her district.' The
Supreme Court affirmed the Mississippi Supreme Court's rejection of
Lum's argument. The Mississippi Supreme Court had held that the
Mississippi Constitution required the state to have colored schools and
White schools.'66 It reasoned that because there was no controversy with
respect to Martha being non-White, she was ineligible to attend the White
schools.167 Central to the Court's analysis was the idea that while the term
"colored" emerged with reference to Black identity, its meaning in the
Mississippi Constitution was broader, covering non-White identity as well.
Stated differently, for purposes of Mississippi law, Martha Lum, was not
simply non-White; she was also colored.
Hall, Ozawa, and Gong Lum illustrate that while legal regimes are
sometimes framed in Black and White racial terms, they will often have a
multiracial regulatory effect. The critique of the Black/White paradigm
should reflect an awareness of the historical manifestation and
contemporary significance of this racial dynamic.
Racial Compartmentalism. Part of the problem with discussions about
race is that they tend to link each racial group to a particular form of
racism. Rachel Moran and I call this "racial compartmentalism."" While
establishing such linkages is important, they can over-determine how we
think about the relationship between racial identity and racial vulnerability.
This over-determination helps to explain why Asian Americans disappear
in the context of discussions about Jim Crow laws and why Black people
disappear in the context of discussions about immigration. We
compartmentalize particular racial technologies and apply them to explain
.6. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198.
16' 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
6 Id. at 81.
165 See id
'6 See id. at 82, 84.
16 See id at 81-82.
68 CARBADo & MORAN, supra note 86, at 1-36.
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the racial subordination of particular racial groups.169  The Black/White
paradigm critique should not facilitate or contribute to this phenomenon.
Proponents of the critique should help us understand the multiracial
impacts of the various racial regimes-Jim Crow, immigration,
colonialism-under which the people on the bottom have lived. As
mentioned earlier, Laura G6mez's Manifest Destinies is instructive on this
point.
Inter-racial Distancing. The Black/White paradigm critique is almost
always employed to suggest that non-Black people of color have been
harmed by the Black/White paradigm. Critics argue that, as a result of the
Black/White paradigm, antidiscrimination laws and antidiscrimination
efforts more broadly do not always respond to the racial harms Asian
Americans, Latinas/os, and Native Americans experience. This critique
has considerable force.o70 Often it is part of a broader argument that the
Black/White paradigm victimizes non-Black people of color because it
does not capture the nature and extent of their respective racial
subordination.
However, this claim does not tell the whole story about the political
and racial relationship that non-Black people of color have had to the
Black/White binary. Non-Black people of color have not always been
interested in identifying themselves with the Black or marginalized side of
this dichotomy. In fact, there are moments in American history when
certain Asian Americans and Latinas/os have attempted to achieve equality
not by asserting that they are Black or like Blacks or even non-White-but
that they are White. To be sure, the reasons for these assertions are
complicated. Sometimes they reflect pragmatic racial politics. Sometimes
they reflect the terms upon which these groups are forced to engage the
legal system. Still other times they reflect difficult questions about agency,
about choices under constraints. Nonetheless, discussions of the
Black/White paradigm should address head-on the phenomenon of non-
Black assertions of White (or non-Black) identity. I call this "interracial
distancing": The extent to which one minority group adopts a "civil rights"
strategy to distance itself racially and politically from another minority
group. Certainly Blacks have engaged in this strategy. Indeed, in another
paper I am examining whether interracial distancing is implicated in Black
civil rights responses to Japanese American internment.17' The point, then,
169 Cf SUE GOLDING, THE EIGHT TECHNOLOGIES OF OTHERNESS (1997).
17 Consider, for example, the argument that Asian Americans and Latinas/os should not be
entitled to affirmative action. Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 855, 890, 896-97 (1995). This idea has been and should continue to be vigorously challenged.
Marty B. Lorenzo, Race-Conscious Diversity Admissions Programs: Furthering a Compelling Interest,
2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 361, 413-14 (1997).
1' See generally Devon W. Carbado, Race, Law & Citizenship: Black Civil Rights Responses to
Japanese-American Internment (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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is not that non-Black people of color have engaged in interracial distancing
and that Black people have not. I am simply suggesting that the critique of
the Black/White paradigm is incomplete to the extent that it fails to
identify the specific ways in which people of color have (a) engaged in
interracial distancing and (b) attempted to occupy both the marginalized
and the privileged ends of the Black/White polarity.
The Space for Race-Specific Interventions. Notwithstanding that the
faces at the bottom of the well are multi-racial,17 2 the Black/White
paradigm critique should be tolerant of, and appreciate the necessity for,
race-specific, including Black-specific, antiracist discourse and political
activity. Moreover, the critique should be careful not to mark Asian- or
Latino-specific analyses of race as multi-racial over and against Black-
specific engagements. It should recognize, instead, that we can, should,
and sometimes must racially particularize our civil rights engagements.
Antiracism that is structured around a particular racial group is potentially
problematic, but not inevitably so.
The Authors of the Black/White Paradigm. If part of the Black/White
paradigm critique is the suggestion that Blacks (on the bottom) have
played a role in constituting this paradigm, it should indicate the nature of
this role (and it ought to be something more than Blacks writing about
Blacks) and how this role differs from or is the same as the role that
Whites (on the top) play in constituting the paradigm. I raise this point to
suggest that, even to the extent that Blacks and Whites are racially invested
in the Black/White paradigm, the nature of their racial investment is
sometimes quite different. Black investment might reflect what Angela
Harris calls "Black exceptionalism"-the notion that Black people are and
historically have been the racially subordinated amongst the racially
subordinated.173 White investment, in addition to reflecting this form of
exceptionalism, will sometimes reflect another form of exceptionalism:
racially speaking, Blacks are exceptionally different from Whites, that is,
the very opposite of Whites.174 Under this latter form of exceptionalism,
White is what Black is not (and never can be), and Black is not what White
is (and never can be). In other words, there may be meaningful differences
between the stories that Black people employ the Black/White paradigm to
tell and those that White people tell using the very same paradigm.
Certainly, it is not the case that, in a broad political sense, Black people
and White people are working together to tell the same Black and White
story about American race relations. At least discursively, the notion of a
172 See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992).
173 Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby--LatCrit and the Sticky
Mess ofRace, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997).
171 Cf Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment, supra note 19, at 1373 (observing the ways in
which White identity is constructed in opposition to Black identity).
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Black/White paradigm obscures this racial difference and helps to
legitimize an historically inaccurate narrative in which Black people and
White people exist in equipoise with respect to the Paradigm and are united
in advancing a common Black/White racial story about American law,
history, and politics.7'
None of the foregoing is intended to suggest that the critique of the
Black/White Paradigm has been unproductive. It is important for Critical
Race Scholars to address the concerns that inform the Black/White
paradigm critique. Antiracist politics and legal interventions should not
reflect the notion-implicitly or explicitly-that racial subordination and
Black subordination are one and the same thing. Repudiating the claim
that Blackness has the representative capacity to capture the racial
experiences of other people of color is entirely right. Unfortunately, the
critique of the Black/White paradigm does far more than that. That is why
I am suggesting that LatCrit Scholars and Critical Race Theorists think
carefully not only about the arguments people advance against the
Black/White Paradigm but about the very notion of the paradigm itself.
4. Class. CRT scholars should more directly engage class. For the
most part, scholars outside of the field of CRT are framing the debate
about race and class. The CRT literature on race and class is decidedly
thin. 7 6  I am certainly not the first CRT scholar to call for a more
meaningful engagement of class within CRT. Richard Delgado,1" Athena
Mutua,178 Daria Roithmayr 7 9 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres,180 Angela
Harris,' 8 ' Anthony Farley,182 Trina Jones,88 and Darren Hutchinson,'8
among others, have urged the same. Nor do I want to overstate the absence
1' As I have suggested elsewhere, perhaps we should jettison the term the Black/White Paradigm
in favor of the White over Black Paradigm. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, supra note 93, at 1306 n.54.
Athena Mutua has suggested the same. See Mutua, Shifting Bottoms, supra note 154, at 1179.
176 This is not to say there has been no writing on the subject. See, e.g., Symposium, Going Back
to Class? The Reemergence of Class in Critical Race Theory, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. (Fall 2005).
77 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REv. 121 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 36 (critiquing the direction of CRT and calling for greater
examination of the relationship between race and class)).
78 Mutua, Rise, Development and Future Direction, supra note 8, at 345-47; see also Athena D.
Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of Economic
Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859 (2008).
17 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 85.
1so See generally LANI GUINIER & GERARD TORRES: THE MINER'S CANARY: RE-THINKING
RACE AND POWER (2002).
181 See Harris, supra note 88, at 585 (arguing that the work of other theorists, "though powerful
and brilliant in many ways, relies on what [she] call[s] gender essentialism-the notion that a unitary,
'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual
orientation, and other realities of experience").
182 Anthony Farley, Accumulation, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 51 (2005).
183 See generally Jones, supra note 90 (examining the relationship between race and class).
'4 See, e.g., Hutchinson, Unexplainable, supra note 80 (examining the roles of race and class in
the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence).
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of class in CRT analyses. Some scholars are in fact taking class
seriously. 85 Still, I agree with Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic that
Critical Race Theory has yet to develop a comprehensive theory of
class."'
This does not mean that I share the material/discursive dichotomy that
Delgado has articulated as a point of departure for his "materialist" critique
of CRT. According to Delgado, "after a promising beginning, [CRT]
began to focus almost exclusively on discourse at the expense of power,
history, and similar material determinants of minority-group fortunes."' 87
While it is beyond the scope of the point I am making here to fully engage
the discourse/power disaggregation that underwrites Delgado's claim, it
might be helpful to invoke Michael Omi and Howard Winant's notion of a
racial project to explain why that disaggregation is flawed. Omi and
Winant describe a racial project as "simultaneously an interpretation,
representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to
reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines."88
Under their theory, which they link to broader claims about "racial
formation," interpretations and representations (what Delgado would
presumably call the discourse or discursive) are constitutive of re-
organizations and redistributions (what Delgado would presumably call the
material). Nevertheless, Delgado is entirely right to suggest that we can,
and should, do better with respect to the space class occupies in CRT.
One indication that we have not paid enough attention to class is that
CRT scholars are virtually absent from the debates about corporate power
and income redistribution. Cheryl Wade,'" Len Baynes,' 90 Dorothy
Brown,' 9' Beverly Moran,' 92 Steven Bender,'1 Emma Jordan and Angela
"1 See, e.g, Symposium, supra note 176.
186 DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 32, at 107.
'n Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 177, at 122. For a thoughtful critique, see Kevin R. Johnson,
Roll Over Beethoven: "A Critical Examination of Recent Writing about Race," 82 TEX. L. REV. 717,
722-26(2004).
18 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1994)
(emphasis in original).
' See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, African-American Entrepreneurs: Integration, Education, and
Exclusion, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 483 (2010); Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting To Discuss Race in
Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 901 (2003).
*
1 See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, The Q-626 Report: A Study Analyzing the Diversity of the 626
Largest Businesses, and the 105 Largest Minority-Owned Businesses, in Queens, 80 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1007 (2006); Leonard M. Baynes, Principal Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental
Interest and Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RUTGERS L. REV.
235 (2004).
191 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity,
and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385 (2007); Dorothy A. Brown, Race and
Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790 (2007); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class and the
Obama Tax Plan, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 575 (2009).
192 See, e.g., RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE (Beverly 1.
Moran ed., 2008); Beverly I. Moran, Capitalism and the Tax System: A Search for Social Justice, 61
1634 CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 43:1593
Harris,' 94 and Tom Joo,195 among others, have each taken up vanous
aspects of these themes in their work. But not enough of us are doing so.
CRT interventions are directed primarily at anti-discrimination law,
constitutional law and, to a lesser extent, criminal justice reform. We have
paid little attention to corporate governance, taxation, and income
redistribution.
Another indication that CRT scholars insufficiently engage class is the
fact that class-based critiques of racial remediation have gone largely
uncontested.'96  These critiques issue not only from the left (via the
argument that "the real question that haunts American politics is the class
question"l 9 7), but also from the right (via the argument that affirmative
action and other racial remediation policies privileges middle class people
of color and the focus is typically on Blacks)'98 and do little to help the
truly disadvantaged.' 99 What are the Critical Race responses to these
arguments? How precisely should CRT theorize the relationship between
race and class? What does Critical Race Theory have to say about middle
and upper class communities of color? Are CRT's engagements with race
sufficiently particularized with respect to class? While the CRT literature
on intersectionality and gender is far from complete, it is much more
robust than the CRT literature on intersectionality and class. Going
forward, CRT scholars need to pay more attention to class than they have
heretofore.200
5. Implicit Bias and Other Forms of Empiricism. In 2005, Jerry Kang
SMU L. REv. 337-78 (2008); Beverly I. Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity:
The Role ofLaw and the Legal System, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219 (2007).
193 Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and
English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1996).
'9 ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (Angela P. Harris &
Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 2011); WHEN MARKETS FAIL: RACE AND ECONOMICS (Angela P.
Harris & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 2005).
' See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the "D-Word," 63 WASH. & LEE. L.
REv. 1579 (2006); Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
955 (2005).
196 But see Harris & Narayan, supra note 102.
19 See Barry Grey, A Historical Milestone? Reflections on Class and Race in America, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/nov2008/pers-nO7.shtml.
This argument is actually also rehearsed by the right.
198 D'SOUZA, END OF RACISM, supra note 127, at 491. This argument is actually also rehearsed
by the left.
'
9 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
2 This should include, but not be limited to, an engagement of class dynamics within
communities of color. On this issue, see EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT:
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH 1880-1920, at 187-207 (1993); ROBIN
D.G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1990);
ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS (1994);
James Forman, Jr., From Martin Luther King to Bill Cosby: Race and Class in the Twenty-First
Century, 50 VILL. L. REV. 213, 213-25 (2005); and Orde Coombs, Soul in Suburbia, HARPER'S MAG.,
Jan. 1972, at 149, 149-60.
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published the Trojan Horses of Race in the Harvard Law Review.20 1 The
article continued a project begun early by, among others, Charles
Lawrence 202 and Linder Krieger203 of mobilizing social psychology to
broaden our understanding of discrimination. Kang's specific intervention
was to draw on a number of implicit bias studies to critique anti-
discrimination models that require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent.
His article has helped to generate a body of implicit bias literature within
CRT204 and is a foundational article in the still-emerging intellectual
movement-"behavioral realism."2 05  These developments are, I think,
enormously important.
At the same time, I echo Glenn Adams and Phia Salter's concern about
the scientification of epistemology. What does it mean for Critical Race
Scholars to turn to science as a marker of truth-and if not truth with a
capital "T," as a marker of facts? What are the normative implications of
CRT's empirical turn? Are some empirical methods more simpatico with
CRT than others? Are some disciplines better suited to advance a CRT
empirical project than others? Darren Hutchinson has argued, for example,
that empirical findings within political science might be particularly
helpful to CRT's normative claims about majoritarian politics and the
ideological nature of Supreme Court jurisprudence.206 Should CRT
scholars employ these and other empirical findings pragmatically-that is,
be results-oriented in their appeal to "verify" facts? This last question
suggests that CRT's engagement with science might not need to be about
truth per se but about "facts."
The difference between "facts" on the one hand and "truth" on the
other is not semantic; it tracks the realism versus anti-realism debate within
the philosophy of science.207 But, quite apart from whether facts are "true"
in the sense of capturing "reality" is whether they matter in the sense of
influencing decision-making-and clearly they do. Which is to say, facts,
and perhaps especially scientific facts, perform epistemological work.
This helps to explain why, currently, as best as I can tell, not a single CRT
scholar is on record rejecting Claude Steele's work on stereotype threat,
notwithstanding that the work is clearly "science."208 Instead, CRT
201 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
202 Lawrence, supra note 83.
203 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
204 See, e.g., Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, supra note 25.
205 See, e.g, Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (2006).
206 Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories, supra note 37, at 1213-14.
207 See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 137, at 1145-46. For an indication of this debate, see
generally JAMES ROBERT BROWN, WHO RULES SCIENCE: AN OPINIONATED GUIDE TO THE WARS
(2001).
20s See, e.g., Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, Stereotypes and the Fragility of Academic
Competence, Motivation, and Self-Concept, in HANDBOOK OF COMPETENCE AND MOTIVATION 436
(Andrew J. Elliot & Carol S. Dweck eds., 2005); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype
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scholars invoke the "scientific fact" of stereotype threat to critique existing
anti-discrimination regimes. More generally, CRT's most powerful
critiques of law and society turn precisely on facts-that racism exists; that
whiteness confers privileges; that discrimination exists outside of
intentionality; that society is not colorblind. Conservatives, for their part,
contest these factual assertions. How do we settle these competing factual
claims when omniscience is impossible? Standpoint epistemology?
Presumably not.
This is not to say that CRT scholars should eschew standpoint
epistemology; in many ways, the debate about narrative in CRT is a debate
about the legitimacy and efficacy of standpoint epistemology as a form of
legal scholarship.2 09 While I have always thought that Critical Race
Theorists overstate the extent to which narrative is central to and a crucial
methodogical component of CRT (I do not believe that narrative is a
necessary entailment of CRT), the methodology is important, and I have
certainly employed it in my own work.210 Thus, I am not arguing against
standpoint epistemology tout court; I am simply suggesting that it is an
unlikely candidate for resolving the "factual" contestations I describe
above.
This brings us back to Adams and Salter's admonition about science,
which Critical Race Theorists should take seriously. Doing so does not
portend the wholesale rejection of science but rather a critical engagement
with science. Part of this might entail more direct analyses of the
interrelated problems of "facts" and "truth"-and not reactively in
response to critiques that CRT is insufficiently foundational and inattentive
to questions of "facts" and "truth," 2 11 but proactively in the sense of
articulating CRT's terms of engagement with science-terms that should
spell out precisely why CRT is turning to science and precisely what the
Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); Claude M. Steele et
al., Contending with Group Image: The Psychology of Stereotype and Social Identity Threat, in 43
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 379 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002); Claude M. Steele
& Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes
Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997).
20 DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 32, at 37-49; Mary I. Coombs,
Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 686 (1992); Richard
Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 744-46 (1993);
Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665
(1993); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411 (1988).
210 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002)
(employing narrative in the prologue); Devon W. Carbado, Motherhood and Work in Cultural Context:
One Woman's Patriarchal Bargain, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1998).
21 Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self Autobiographical Performances in Outsider
Scholaship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
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theory seeks to bring back. This, I believe, is what Adams and Salter are
urging us to do.
One could, of course, frame the foregoing questions about science in
terms of empiricism more generally. What precisely should CRT's
engagement with empiricism look like? To what extent should CRT be
empiricized? As indicated earlier, Jerry Kang has framed this issue in
terms of "Behavioral Realism." Mitu Gulati and I engaged it via an
exploration of what we called "The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory." 212 Laura G6meZ213 and Laura Beth Nielsen2 14 have pursued the
relationship between CRT and empirical methods in the context of law and
society scholarship. And Osagie Obasogie and Joan Williams have taken
up the issue in the context of two workshops at which CRT scholars and
empiricists-political scientists, sociologists, and social psychologists-
critically engaged each other's work. I do not mean to suggest that these
are the only efforts to explore whether and to what extent CRT should be
empiricized. I reference them simply to suggest that the time is ripe for
what one might call "Critical Race Empiricism"-that is, a methodological
approach that would constitute an empirical intervention into CRT and a
CRT intervention into empirical studies.
6. Immigration and Global Affairs. Critical Race Theorists should
continue to grapple with the problems of race and immigration. Kevin
Johnson's work in this area has been particularly helpful.215 One issue ripe
for engagement is the ways in which immigration interacts with, and
shapes the doctrinal content of, other areas of law, including, welfare law,
employment law, family law, and criminal law and procedure. In the
context of criminal procedure, for example, the Supreme Court expressly
permits immigration officials to employ race as one factor among many in
deciding whether a person is undocumented.2 16 Put another way, the Court
expressly authorizes immigration officials to racially profile people of
"apparent Mexican ancestry" on the assumption that such persons are
"illegal." According to the Court, employing Mexican ancestry as a basis
for suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 17 The Court's ruling in this respect is
212 See Devon W. Carbado & G. Mitu Gulati, Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1757 (2003).
213 Laura E. G6rmez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation to
Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. (2010).
214 Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post-Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175-201
(2010).
215 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).
216 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).217 Id
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not limited to immigration enforcement at the border; it applies to
immigration enforcement in the interior as well. 218  This is just one
example of how the plenary power of immigration interacts with race to
weaken the procedural protections another area of law affords. These other
areas of law in effect domesticate the plenary power doctrine, or more
accurately, the plenary doctrine becomes domesticated in these other areas
of law.219 Critical Race Scholars should more systematically mark these
dynamics. Doing so would help to paint a more complete picture of the
racial dimensions of immigration law and enforcement.
CRT Scholars should also continue to engage global affairs. Adrien
Wing has been pushing this point for quite some time. 220  Here, too,
progress has been made. An emerging intellectual movement among
international law scholars-Third World Approaches to International Law
or TWAIL-is explicitly shaped by, and considers itself an expression of,
CRT.22 1 Crenshaw has also helped to establish "Critical Race Theory
Europe," an annual retreat that draws lawyers, law students, and activists
together to discuss and develop a CRT approach to understanding the role
of law in the context of European debates about racism, Islamophobia, and
homo-nationalism. These efforts should be encouraged and supported, not
only because international legal norms and international political
organizing are both increasingly becoming mechanisms through which
legal and political actors seek to effectuate domestic racial reform; 222 but
also because of the transnational racial dynamics that Sumi Cho and Frank
Valdes describe and the comparative dimensions of race that Tanya
Hemndez highlights.
7. Race and Sovereignty. CRT Scholars have insufficiently analyzed the
218 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing some of the ways in which the Supreme Court has watered down
Fourth Amendment protections to facilitate immigration enforcement).
219 See id.
220 For an indication of how Professor Wing has employed CRT to engage global affairs, see, for
example, ADRIEN K. WING, GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER
141 (1996); and Adrien K. Wing, Gender Equality and Governance in Afiica: A Critical Race Feminist
Perspective, in GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE 113 (Cornell Univ., Institute
for African Development 1997).
221 See Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical
Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 891 (2000); Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International
Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000); Chantal Thomas, Critical Race
Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195
(2000).
222 For a discussion of the extent to which, historically, American civil rights activists have turned
to the international arena to secure racial reform "at home," see CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE
PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-
1955 (2003); BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER, RISING WIND: BLACK AMERICANS AND U.S. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 1935-1960 (1996); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002); and see also Eyes On the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years 1954-
1965 (PBS Home Video 2009).
I16392011] CRITICAL WHAT WHA T?
intersection of race and sovereignty.223 This inquiry deeply implicates but
is not exhausted by concerns about indigeniety. Race and Sovereignty was
the focus of UCLA's 5th Annual Critical Race Studies Conference that
Cheryl Harris and Addie Rolnick organized. To provide an indication of
the kinds of questions CRT Scholars might pursue, I quote extensively
from our program description:
Sovereignty, like race, has been invoked, understood, and
deployed in contradictory ways. Historically, sovereignty
has been an important vehicle through which hegemonic
power has been enforced, for example, by articulating
citizenship as a racial project rooted in the power to exclude.
Sovereignty has also been an important tool of anti-colonial
resistance crucial to libratory struggles of people of color in
the U.S. and worldwide. Race shares this complex
dimension, serving as both a technology of oppression and a
vehicle for resistance to that oppression.
Despite these parallels, race and sovereignty have, for the
most part, been engaged as separate and mutually exclusive
projects: sovereignty has primarily been linked to the
struggles of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples,
while the struggles of other people of color have largely been
cast through a standard anti-racist narrative of citizenship and
inclusion. The symposium proposes, instead, to examine
how race and sovereignty intersect and are mutually
constitutive, even as important distinctions remain. We
propose to examine how race enters into concepts of
sovereignty and how sovereignty enters into concepts of race.
Among the questions to be considered are the following:
How has the exercise of national sovereignty explicitly
and implicitly relied upon race as a criterion of membership?
How might a sovereignty framework provide a counter-
223 See J. KHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAllAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 10-11 (2008) (critiquing Critical Race Theory for failing to fully
consider the relationship between racialization, land dispossession and the denial of sovereignty for
indigenous peoples). But see Sumi K. Cho & Gil Gott, The Racial Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY,
EMERGENCY, LEGALITY 182 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010) (exploring the racial contingency of sovereignty);
Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (contesting binary legal framework which associates sovereignty with Indians
and race with other minorities and exploring instead anti-racism inherent in assertions of group political
rights); Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An Essay on "Indigeneity" and
"Whiteness," 18 WASH. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 55-98 (2005) (discussing relationship between whiteness,
challenges to indigenous identity, and sovereign rights).
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narrative to the story of inclusion often associated with civil
rights?
How can a comparative racial analysis contribute to
understanding the possibilities and limits of sovereignty?
How has race influenced the cognizability of claims to
sovereignty? Does the assertion of sovereignty by oppressed
peoples stand subject to the same or similar critiques of the
exercise of sovereign power by dominant national
formations? 224
There is not nearly enough CRT scholarship exploring the foregoing
themes.
8. Post-racialism. We need to think very carefully about how we
articulate CRT's relationship to post-racialism. As I suggested earlier,
post-racialism is becoming, but is not yet, the rhetorical replacement for
colorblindness. What do we do about that? We could engage post-
racialism as though it were already the new colorblindness. And, in fact,
there are CRT scholars who have critiqued post-racialism in precisely
those terms. Alternatively, we could attempt to re-claim, or "normatively
turn," the still-emerging ideological valence of post-racialism. Which
approach makes the most sense? This, for me, is a genuinely hard issue:
Should we treat post-racialism as though its racial valence is exhausted by
a colorblind normativity? Can we do to post-racialism what conservatives
have done to colorblindness-make it our racial project? Crenshaw
articulates the "[t]he stakes in interrogating post-racialism" this way:
In interrogating the many possible ways that "post" can
be thought to be doing a certain kind of ideological work, it is
apparent that "post racial" need not take on the meanings to
which I attribute the term herein. For example, the "post" in
post-colonial or post-apartheid signals that the past does not
simply precede the present but partly constitutes it. In this
sense, the significance of "post" is not in the signaling of a
before and an after, but in signaling a range of factors-
potentially undefined-that make the contemporary social
order a variation of the prototype, not its opposite. By
contrast, the function of the "post" that garners considerable
traction in post-racial discourse today operates not only to de-
historicize race in American society, but also to reframe the
contours of this contemporary moment as constituting the
opposite of what preceded it. By these lights, a post-racial
224 Fifth Annual Symposium: Race and Sovereignty, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, CRITICAL RACE
STUDIEs, http://www.law.ucla.edu/academic-programs-and-courses/specializations/critical-race-
studies/5th-annual-symposium/Pages/default.aspx.
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America is a racially egalitarian America, no longer
measured by sober assessments of how far we have come, but
by congratulatory declarations that we have arrived.225
Whether the "post" in post-racial comes to mean "the variation of the
prototype" turns at least in part on how CRT Scholars describe and
mobilize the term.
9. Doctrinal Interventions. Critical Race Theorists should spend more
time thinking about doctrinal interventions, notwithstanding that the space
for doctrinal reform is decidedly cramped. Against the backdrop of
juridical retrenchment, it makes sense that most of our work would be
deconstructive. But what are the reconstructive possibilities? This
question need not, and indeed should not, be limited to Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Nor should we focus entirely on federal law. Finally, in
pursuing this effort, we should be thinking about legislative and
administrative reform possibilities as well. This project might be
especially important given CRT's engagement with CLS on the question of
race, rights, and reform.
10. Reproducing CRT. What are the current institutional mechanisms
for reproducing CRT? I mean to ask this question on multiple levels,
including law school admissions practices, trajectories into teaching, and
venues for nurturing the development of CRT. Where are we having
collective conversations about how to reproduce CRT Scholars and
scholarship? Is this what LatCrit Conferences currently do? Should the
CRT Workshop be revived? If so, what institutional form should it take?
Frank Valdes gave a wonderful presentation at the National People of
Color Conference at Rutgers Law School, Camden, last year (which I hope
he will publish) in which he indicated the careful and strategic organizing
that led to the development and institutionalization of the Federalist
Society. Are CRT scholars engaged in a similar organizational effort?
Should they be? How would any such effort interact with the American
Constitution Society, which fashions itself as the progressive alternative to
the Federalist Society?
The foregoing questions invite us to think about our collaborative
interactions more generally. While UCLA continues to be the only law
school with a Critical Race Studies Specialization, there are several law
schools with race law centers of one form or another. Earlier this year,
Trina Jones organized a meeting at UC Irvine Law School to get people
affiliated with the various race centers in the same room to discuss our
respective programs. 2 6  Each program representative responded to a
225 Crenshaw, Twenty Years, supra note 4, at 1313.
226 I represented UCLA's Critical Race Studies Program; Bob Chang represented the Fred
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law; Guy Charles represented
the Center on Law, Race, and Politics at Duke Law School; Charles Daye (by teleconference)
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number of crucial questions: What kind of events does your center
organize? How many faculty are affiliated? Do you hire fellows?
Sponsor summer programs? Organize lecture series? Is there a curricular
component? If so, are there clinical offerings? What kind of budget do
you have? Do you engage in community outreach? Does your center have
a pipeline program to facilitate the entrance of people of color into law
schools? Do you file amicus briefs? Sponsor symposia? Is there a
publication arm? A blog? A newsletter? What's your vision for the center
going forward? This meeting was an important first step. Clearly, not
everyone affiliated with these centers would self-describe as a Critical
Race Theorists. Still, the centers do present organizational opportunities
that we have yet to exploit.
The foregoing issues and themes are not exhaustive of the questions
one can raise about CRT. But engaging them might help us take up
Crenshaw's challenge of "looking backwards to move forward."
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